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Lifting Burdens: Proof, Social Justice, and Public
Assistance Administrative Hearings *
By Lisa Brodoff**

I.

INTRODUCTION

For low-income public assistance recipients and applicants, the
consequences can be literally fatal when the state cuts, terminates, or
denies welfare benefits. While death may be an uncommon outcome,
low-income families frequently face hunger, homelessness,
disability, or lack of medical care' following the loss of critical
* This article was originally published by the New York University Review of
Law & Social Change, and can be located at 32 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
131 (2008). J. NAALJ obtained permission to reprint this article both from the the
New York University Review of Law & Social Change and the author.
** Clinical law professor at Seattle University School of Law and former
Chief Administrative Law Judge for the Washington State Office of Administrative
Hearings and Chief Review Judge for the Department of Social and Health
Services. I would like to thank my research assistants over the course of this
project: Bio Park, Deidra Foster, J. Claire Brown, Rachel Leos, Carla Calogero,
and Chad Kirby, in particular for his excellent comments and editing assistance;
Stephanie Wilson, research librarian extraordinaire; Professor Anne Enquist for her
wisdom and encouragement; Professor Deborah Maranville for her generosity in
helping me to develop my ideas and to create a structure for this article; Professor
Ron Slye, for his review and sage comments on my draft, Dean Kellye Testy for
support of my scholarship, and New York University Review ofLaw & Social
Change Senior Articles Editor Charlotte Taylor for her outstanding work on this
article. Finally, I want to thank my partner, Lynn Grotsky, for her unwavering love
and support.
' See infra Part I.A. See also Vicki Lens, Work Sanctions Under Welfare
Reform: Are They
Helping Women Achieve Self-Sufficiency?, 13 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
255, 263-64 (2006) [hereinafter Lens, Work Sanctions] ("[Under TANF,
s]anctioned families are at an increased risk of hunger and food insecurity. Housing
conditions can deteriorate, as sanctioned families run an increased risk of
homelessness, eviction, and utility shut-offs. Medical needs can go unmet. Children
are particularly vulnerable. One study found that young children in sanctioned
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benefits like Medicaid,2 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
("TANF"),3 Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"),4 and Food
Stamps.s Children living in poverty can be adversely impacted for
life when their families lose such benefits. Statistics show that family
poverty disproportionately results in lower school performance 6 and
an increased likelihood of mental illness for children.7
When a state or federal agency acts to deny or limit the safety-net
welfare benefits of one of its vulnerable clients, that client can
challenge the action in an administrative agency hearing.8 In the

families were at an increased risk for food insecurity and hospitalizations as
compared to children in nonsanctioned families. Since sanctioned families are cut
off from their only means of support, they must seek alternative and often less
stable means to survive. While some sanctioned families find employment, sell
possessions, and turn to family members for support, one study found that
sanctioning is also associated with illegal activities, such as begging and
stealing.").
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000).

U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (2000).
5 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036 (2000).
3 42
4

6LISA G. KLEIN & JANE KNITZER, PROMOTING EFFECTIVE EARLY LEARNING:
WHAT EVERY POLICYMAKER AND EDUCATOR SHOULD KNOW (Jan. 2007),
available at http://www.nccp.org/publications/pub_695.html.
7
RACHEL MASI & JANICE L. COOPER, CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH: FACTS
FOR POLICYMAKERS (Nov. 2006), available at
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pub-687.html.
I See generallyGoldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-68 (1970) (holding that
welfare recipients have due process rights under the U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sect.
I, to notice and a pretermination hearing); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2000)
(requiring that state plans for medical assistance provide an opportunity for a fair
hearing if benefits are denied or terminated); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2000)
(requiring that states administering TANF programs offer hearings when benefits
are denied or terminated); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200-431.250 (2007) (setting out
procedures for Medicaid hearings); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1400-416.1461 (2007)
(setting out procedures for SSI hearings); 7 C.F.R. § 273.15 (2007) (setting out
procedures for Food Stamps hearings). But see
Laura C. Conway, Will ProceduralDue Process Survive After Aid to Families
with Dependent Children is Gone?, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 209, 219
(1996) ("[the TANF program now] requires only that states provide objective
criteria for 'fair and equitable treatment, including an explanation of how the state
will provide opportunities for recipients who have been adversely affected to be
heard in a State administrative or appeal process.' Whether providing for recipients
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hearing process, welfare clients can present their case for benefits to
an Administrative Law Judge ("AL") or hearing officer who will
determine whether the agency was correct in taking away or
altogether denying the assistance.
I contend that the current administrative hearing structure is the
primary social justice system for poor people in the United States and
that this system is fundamentally unfair to the low-income appellants
who seek justice there. For the resolution of disputes regarding
access to food, shelter, clothing, and health care, low-income clients
do not use the system in place for wealthier people in our country the state and federal judiciary. Rather, the only real civil justice
system available and accessible to the poor is the administrative
hearing process in the executive branch of government.
Administrative hearings in state and federal agencies that administer
social welfare programs determine who gets and who keeps public
assistance benefits that are critical to the health and welfare of poor
families. There is little recourse when these benefits are denied by the
hearings officer. These executive branch courts decide thousands of
cases yearly, yet they are rarely scrutinized by the legal community
to determine if their decisions are fair. 9
The primary providers of legal representation for those appealing
decisions by welfare agencies have been Legal Services Corporation
("LSC")-funded programs throughout the country.o However,
to be heard means that states must provide the notice and elaborate pretermination
hearings mandated by Goldberg v. Kelly is questionable.").
' See Vicki Lens, BureaucraticDisentitlementAfter Welfare Reform: Are Fair
Hearingthe Cure?, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 13, 36 (2005) [hereinafter
Lens, BureaucraticDisentitlement] ("[S]ince the earlier studies ... there have been
virtually no empirical studies conducted on the fair hearing process."). See also
Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the ParadoxofLawyering For the Poor,56
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 882-87 (1990) (asserting that even in a post-Goldbergera of
procedural "tailoring" to accommodate the plaintiff, the judicial branch retains the
position and power to tailor); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side ofDue
Process:Some Theoretical and LitigationNotes on the Assurance ofAccuracy,
Fairness,and Timelines in the Adjudication ofSocial Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL
L. REV. 772, 775 (1974) (extending earlier commentary on want of fairness and
efficacy in welfare claim adjudication and offering that a management approach to
the adjudication of welfare claims would better respond to due process concerns
than adversarial system).
1oIn 2003, LSC-funded programs closed over 126,000 cases concerning
income and benefits. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 2003-2004 ANNUAL REPORT
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federal grants to provide civil legal services to low-income clients
have been drastically reduced over the last twenty-five years, 1
leaving clients virtually without representation in the administrative
hearing process.' 2 Even in the best of times, representation in these
hearings has been extremely low.13 The vast majority of clients who
8 (2004) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT], availableat
http://www.Isc.gov/about/pdfs/AnnualReport2003-2004.pdf.
" In inflation adjusted dollars, the LSC funding of 1980 totaled $300 million,
while the 2004 appropriation was less than half that amount at $147.3 million. Id.
at 18-19. Currently, millions of poor Americans are ineligible for legal assistance
because their incomes are just above the federal poverty threshold, and there is
insufficient funding to meet the civil legal needs of those who do qualify:
Despite LSC's current congressional support, the unmet
legal needs of America's poor remain staggering ....
[C]urrent federal funding is clearly inadequate to serve the
civil legal needs of the more than 45.2 million poor Americans
eligible for LSC-funded legal assistance. Millions of eligible
clients are forestalled from pursuing justice every year. Still
millions more-whose incomes are just above the federal
poverty threshold but who nonetheless cannot afford adequate
legal representation-are effectively denied access to the U.S.
civil justice system as well.
Id. at 18.
12Even in SSI cases, where attorney's fees for representation at administrative
hearings are recoverable from back awards of benefits, 40% of claimants came to
hearings without attorney representation. SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD,
DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND MATERIALS 78 (May 2006) [hereinafter
SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD], availableat http://
http://www.ssab.gov/sumrDisabilityChartbook.shtml. The poor are more likely
than others to be unrepresented in the civil legal system. Deborah L. Rhode, Access
to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1785, 1788-90 (2001) [hereinafter Rhode, Access
to Justice]. Manpower and funds for providing representation to those who can't
afford it are scarce. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 1013, 1014 (2004) ("[Flewer than 1%of American lawyers are
in legal services practice, which works out to about one lawyer for every 1400 poor
or near poor person, and a per capita annual expenditure for civil legal aid of only
about $2.25. For that amount, not much due process is available."). As a result, the
poor are more likely to either unsuccessfully navigate the legal system or choose to
forego the system even with a meritorious claim.
13 The high-water mark for legal services funding occurred briefly in 1980
when the "minimum access" goal of two lawyers per 10,000 poor people was met
for the first time. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 18. In 1982, Congress cut
LSC's budget by 25%, resulting in the closing of 285 legal services offices and the
laying off of 1,793 attorneys and 952 paralegals. Id The minimum access goal has
not been met since 1980. Id. See also Cesar A. Perales, The FairHearingProcess:
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disagree with the state or federal agency's decision to cut, deny or
eliminate benefits must face the agency alone, put on evidence, argue
the law - in sum, make their case to the judge.1 4 They are on their
own in this justice system, and it is the only game in town.
At the same time that there are fewer legal representatives
available, even more people are in need." Given this combination of
scarce benefits and overwhelming need, we must focus on the only
process available for those who question the state's allocation of
those limited benefits. If appellants are essentially on their own in the
hearing process, and critical benefits are at stake, then we ought to
make sure that the process itself is fair, accurate and errs on the side
of eligibility for the benefits.
I propose that the public benefits hearing process is in fact
fundamentally unfair to low-income appellants and that these
appellants are almost always at a significant disadvantage in the
hearing process. Given that this forum decides cases involving
critical needs benefits, I suggest that this system needs a built-in
safeguard to insure a more reliable and fair result for clients and to
guard against agencies acting arbitrarily in their distribution of scarce
Guardianof the Social Service System, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 893 (1990) (noting
that despite adherence of New York's administrative appeal system to the principles
of
Goldbergv. Kelly, the majority of appellants appeared pro se due to cuts in
legal services). Cf Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321 (Implementing cuts in funding
for legal aid).
14 Statistics on representation at public assistance hearings on the state level
are difficult to obtain. The Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings,
which holds hearings for all welfare programs in the state, gave me statistics for
hearings held for the year of July 2005 through June 2006. In that year, of 11,722
hearing requests, only 112 had attorney representation (less than 1%). Of the 1,736
litigants who received a hearing, only 286 had representation (16%). Washington
State Office of Administrative Hearings Statistics (on file with author) [hereinafter
WA OAH Statistics].
15 In 2004, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that 12.7% of the population lives
below the poverty line. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, &
CHERYL HILL LEE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2004 9 (2005), availableat
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf. That was the fourth

consecutive annual increase in poverty rates. Id. Overall, there were 37 million
people living in poverty, up 1.1 million people from 2003. Id. More than 45 million
people in the U.S. were without health insurance. Id. at 16.
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resources. Specifically, I propose that the power imbalance that
currently favors the state in the hearing process be leveled by shifting
the burdens of production and persuasion' 6 to the state and by
instituting a clear and convincing evidence standard in all hearings
involving the denial, reduction, overpayment, or termination of
needs-based public assistance. I argue that a new, heavy, and
appellant-favored burden of proof in these types of administrative
hearings is the best method for achieving a socially just public
assistance hearing system for the poor while at the same time
meeting agency efficiency and policy needs." Placing a "clear and
convincing evidence" burden on the government is responsive to
policy considerations regarding access to information, fairness, and
risk allocation. Leveling the playing field by lifting the burden of
proof from low-income appellants in our biased system should be a
high priority for policy makers when the risk of an erroneous loss of
life-sustaining benefits is so high.
There is an ongoing debate in the legal community about the best
ways to provide justice for low-income civil litigants who cannot
afford representation in their disputes with more powerful opponents,
particularly in cases involving access to food, shelter, clothing,
healthcare, income and protection of their children and themselves.
Some argue that the best way of resolving this problem is to provide
attorney representation to all who need counsel." Those who favor a
of persuasion means "the notion that if the evidence is evenly
balanced, the party that bears the burden of persuasion must lose," and burden of
production means "a party's obligation to come forward with evidence to support
its claim." Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994).
" Note that I am not proposing that the solution to the inequity of the
administrative hearing system for public assistance applicants is that lawyers be
provided for all appellants. Representation alone does not solve the inequity of this
system. See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
8See, e.g., Simran Bindra and Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A
Right to Counselfor Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
(2003); Rachel Kleinman, HousingGideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction
Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2004); Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice:
The UnitedStates'Failureto Recognize a Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation,79
WASH. U. L.Q. 317 (2001); John Nethercut, "This Issue Will Not Go Away... ":
Continuing to Seek the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
481 (2004); Symposium, A Right to a Lawyer? Momentum Grows, 40
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 167 (2006).
16Burden
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"civil Gideon"l 9 believe that only attorney representation will level
the playing field for low-income litigants who face eviction, loss of
custody, or civil rights violations, or who find themselves in a dispute
over eligibility for public benefits. 20 Some believe that attorney
representation is critical, but argue that the more cost-effective
method of providing equal access to justice is to increase and
stabilize funding for legal services programs and pro bono programs
and require all attorneys to do pro bono work.2 1
Others believe that counsel is not the solution. They argue that
market forces allow those with money and power to buy better
representation and use tactics that do not serve justice, even when the
low-income client is provided with a lawyer. 22 Instead, some argue
that court procedures need to be simplified and standardized in order
to make it easier for pro se litigants to navigate the system alone.
They favor increased use of such aids as pro se projects, do-it-

" "Civil Gideon" is a term used to describe efforts to establish a right to
counsel in civil cases. The case that established this right in the criminal context
was Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Anthony Lewis popularized Mr.
Gideon's story in his book Gideon's Trumpet. ANTHONY LEWIs, GIDEON'S
TRUMPET (Vintage Books 1989) (1964).
20 Indeed, the American Bar Association House of Delegates unanimously
passed a resolution on August 7, 2006 that reads: "RESOLVED, That the American
Bar Association urges federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal
counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in those
categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as
those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as determined
by each jurisdiction." See American Bar Ass'n, Resolution of the House of
Delegates 112A (Aug. 7, 2006), availableat
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06Al 12A.pdf.
21 Helaine M. Barnett, An Innovative Approach to PermanentState Funding of
Civil Legal Services: One State's Experience-So Far,17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
469 (1998) (describing efforts to increase funding for legal services in New York
State); Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable
Response to the Lack of ProBono Legal Services andShould Law School Clinics
Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1884-85 (1999) (describing increase
in pro bono hour requirement for District of Columbia attorneys).
22 See Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Marketfor Justice: Why
Access To Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of
Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 970 (2004) ("[T]he reality is that our

legal system largely distributes legal services through the market and justice
through an adversary system where the quality of legal services has a major
influence.").
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yourself divorce kits, courthouse facilitators and self-help plus forms,
postulating that civil Gideon will never happen or is not the best
solution. 23 Some say the solution is placing an obligation on court
clerks, judges, and opposing counsel to give advice and assistance to
pro se litigants. 24 Finally, some argue that in civil cases where one
party is pro se, the judge should play a more prominent role as an
"active umpire" in the dispute in order to level the playing field.2 5
In my view, none of these proposed solutions effectively meets
the needs of clients in the public assistance hearing system while
preserving the basic tenets of administrative law. The administrative
hearing system is designed to be a less formal and more flexible
alternative to the court system, as well as a quick, efficient, and
economical method of resolving disputes between clients and
agencies.26 While having a more active judge and better pro se
See, e.g., Drew A. Swank, In Defense ofRules andRoles: The Need to Curb
Extreme Forms ofPro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 1537, 1549-73 (2005); Deborah J. Cantrell, Justicefor Interests of the
Poor: The Problem ofNavigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1573, 1578-82 (2002); Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 12, at 1816;
23

RICHARD ZORZA, THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE SELF-HELP
FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE
WITHOUT LAWYERS (2002),

http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResProSeSelfHelpCtPub.pdf.
24 See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Strugglefor Access to
Justice: Meeting the ChallengeofBench andBar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36,
46-49 (2002) (arguing that court staff should be trained to provide basic legal
information to pro se litigants, that pretrial conferences should be conducted to
prepare pro se litigants for trial, that judges should be authorized to assist pro se
litigants and facilitate introduction of their evidence, and that judges should be
allowed to ask questions, call witnesses, and conduct limited investigations).
25 Pearce, supra note 22, at 970; See Russell Engler, And Justicefor AllIncluding the UnrepresentedPoor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators,
and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987 (1999).
26

See, e.g., Christopher B. McNeil, The Marginal Utility of Consolidated
Agency Hearings in Ohio: A Due Process Analysisfrom an Economic Perspective,
32 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 127, 127 (2006) ("Why, then, do state agencies take on the
responsibilities ofjudging? In short, because doing so is an efficient means of
resolving conflicts between the government and the governed. When compared to
the use of judicial-branch structures like trial by jury, an agency adjudication is
vastly more efficient: it uses less time and fewer governmental resources, it costs
the participants much less, and it reaps an enormous benefit from having
adjudicators who are specialists in the field and who actually know the policies
contained within the controlling statutes and regulations. The agency becomes an
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materials can be helpful, these solutions do not tackle the injustices
faced by appellants in the hearing process, where cultural differences,
language ability, impaired health, lack of education and lack of
access to information often present major barriers to a fair hearing.2 7
Requiring lawyer representation for all welfare appellants does not
adequately address the "underlying imbalance and fissures in the
hearing room between clients and the hearing officer who judges
them and the agency representatives who question them."28 I am
proposing here a new avenue of redress which is less resource
intensive and more responsive to the policy considerations of both
government and citizens: lifting the burden of proof off indigent
appellants and placing it on the state in all needs-based assistance
hearings.2 9
In Part I, I examine the public assistance hearing system and
show why it is the primary social justice mechanism for public
benefits applicants and recipients. I describe the critical nature of
public assistance and the importance of the hearing process in
assuring access to those benefits. Using Washington State's
appellant-oriented central panel system as well as other states'
systems as examples, I show why appellants are at a significant and
unfair disadvantage in the administrative hearing system. In Part II, I
describe current practice in public assistance administrative hearings
and demonstrate that generally the burden of proof is difficult to
locate, inconsistently applied, or placed on the applicant or recipient
challenging the agency decision. 30 In Part III, I argue that the burden

adjudicator and steps into the judicial role; doing so has proven to be very effective
in helping to make sure that claims involving property and liberty interests, that is,
claims that are entitled to due process protection, are resolved with the least burden
to all participants, as well as helping it ensure a fair and impartial decision-making
process.").
27 See infra Part I.B.
28 Vicki Lens, In the FairHearingRoom: Resistance and Confrontationin the
Welfare Bureaucracy,32 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 309, 330 (2007) [hereinafter Lens,
FairHearingRoom]. Lens suggests that an expansion of the standards of proof and
the relevance of evidence in hearings would "subvert the hierarchy of power
embedded in the bureaucracy. Instead of clients adapting to the bureaucracy, it
would adapt to clients." Id. at 331.
29 See infra Part III.
30 While one might expect that the burdens of production and persuasion
would be placed on the low-income appellant challenging the agency's decision to

610

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

30-2

of proof should be standardized in a way that favors the welfare
benefits appellant: the government should bear the burden of proving
ineligibility by clear and convincing evidence in all needs-based
public assistance hearings. The policies that, in general, inform
courts' and commentators' analyses of which party should bear the
burden of proof - efficiency, access to information, fairness and risk
allocation - all point toward placing the burden on the state in
administrative hearings where critical needs are at stake. I examine
other areas of administrative law and civil litigation in which the
burden of proof has been placed on the government or its equivalent,
rather than on the appellant. The policy considerations that dictate
placing the burden on the state in these areas are equally or even
more compelling in the public assistance arena. I detail methods for
accomplishing this change. Finally, I discuss the impact that a burden
shift would have: I respond to potential objections to this change by
examining the fiscal, efficiency, and social justice implications of
making the state prove a recipient's ineligibility for welfare benefits
in every instance.

II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING SYSTEM ISUNFAIR TO PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE APPELLANTS
Two of the three factors that inform courts' and legislators'
decisions about who should carry the burden of proof in a proceeding
directly entail considerations of what might broadly be termed social
justice. One primary consideration is who ought to be favored when
comparing the risks and social costs between two potentially wrong
decisions. Courts also consider fairness - in other words, which of the
parties is in the greater position of power in the litigation and can
therefore more easily bear the burden.3 ' The third factor can also be
analyzed in these terms: the burden of proving facts is often placed
upon the party that has the best and easiest access to the relevant
information in the case. This promotes the goal of procedural
efficiency, but it also involves an inquiry into the difficulty and costs,
for each party, of acquiring information.
reduce, deny, or terminate benefits, in practice the burden allocation is often
unclear. See infra Part II for my detailed discussion of this topic.
' See infra Part III.B for a full discussion of the policies behind burden
allocation.
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The following overview of the obstacles facing appellants in
public assistance hearings illustrates the gravity of the issues
involved and lays the foundation for my argument that the policy
concerns that govern burden setting strongly favor placing the burden
on the government in this context. Subsection A examines the high
stakes for clients who have been deprived of public benefits due to a
denial of an application, a termination, a denial of particular services
or equipment, or an overpayment assessment by a government
agency. I also demonstrate that appellants have virtually no ability to
successfully appeal an administrative hearing decision into the
judicial branch, thus leaving the hearing as the only real forum for
relief from agency error in determining welfare ineligibility. In other
words, the social costs of a wrong decision for the applicant are
overwhelming. Next, subsection B considers fairness and shows how
the hearing process is stacked against the low-income appellant. It
also touches on the fact that the information needed to make a
determination of eligibility is more readily accessible to the
government than to the applicant.
A. The Stakes Are High for Appellants in Public Assistance
Hearings
The policy considerations that lead courts and legislators to place
the burden of proof on one party over another, and to set the standard
of proof at the higher "clear and convincing" level, include the
potential magnitude of one party's loss as compared to another.32
Exceptions to the general "preponderance of the evidence" rule are
made when important interests that need to be protected are at stake
in the proceedings. Here, I will lay the foundation for the argument
that both the assignment of the burden and the quantum of proof need
to be changed because the cost of a wrongful termination of critical
needs benefits is so onerous.
One of the primary purposes of public assistance is to meet the
"brutal needs" 33 of the poor, in particular needy families with
32 See infra Part III.
13 Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (describing food, clothing,
shelter, income, and health care as "brutal needs" and finding that the constitutional
right to procedural due process includes the right to a fair hearing when access to
such resources is denied). The Goldberg court wrote:
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children,3 4 and of those who are too old or disabled to work.35

Welfare programs 36 like SSI, TANF, and state funded programs for
the disabled like General Assistance for the Unemployable ("GAU")37 provide at least a subsistence level of income to those at or
below the poverty level (who are also disabled, old, or have minor
children with no other means of support). Because low-income
families and individuals often rely on welfare programs as their sole
means of support, an agency's decision to deny, reduce, or terminate
this source of income can have a devastating impact.
There are numerous governmental programs designed to assist
people who lack food, income, shelter, or healthcare. Below I
highlight the major programs and show why they are critical to
meeting the basic needs of recipients.
Food and nutrition are provided directly to eligible low-income
individuals in the form of food stamps.3 1 Congress recognized the
critical nature of this benefit in its declaration of policy in the
authorizing statute of the Food Stamp Program: "The policy of
For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain
essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. Thus the crucial factor
in this context ... is that termination of aid pending resolution of a
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very
means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent
resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to
concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn,
adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy.
Id. at 264. Subsequent decisions have limited the Goldberg presumption that
public assistance denials involve matters of vital importance to clients. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (holding that in balancing an
appellant's rights and needs with the government's interest in efficient adjudication,
an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to termination of Social Security
disability payments).
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1) (2000) (stating that the purpose of the TANF
program is to aid needy families).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2000) (stating that the purpose of the SSI program is
to aid individuals over 65, the blind, and the disabled).
36 For purposes of this article, I define "welfare" as financial, medical, housing,
food, or other assistance aimed at meeting basic human needs that is provided to
individuals or families by governmental entities based on the recipients' inability to
pay.
3 See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 74.04.005(6)(a) (2001) (defining the scope of
Washington's "General Assistance" program).
38 Food Stamp Program, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2000).
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Congress [is] ... to safeguard the health and well-being of the
Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition . . .. Congress finds

that the limited food purchasing power of low-income households
contributes to hunger and malnutrition . ...39 The Food and
Nutrition Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, the
agency that administers the Food Stamp Program, describes the
benefit as "the cornerstone of the Federal food assistance programs,"
which "provides crucial support to needy households." 40 Food Stamp
recipients are made up of the most vulnerable and poor of our
populace: 50% are children, 8%are elderly, and to be eligible
recipients must have gross incomes of less than 130% of the national
poverty guidelines.4 1
The two major programs that provide income benefits to needy
families are TANF and SSI. The TANF program provides monthly
income, training, and other benefits to low-income families that
qualify. 4 2 TANF replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") benefits as part of Congress' 1996 welfare reform
legislation, and created the new principle that the poor are not
entitled to welfare benefits.4 3 Adoption of the TANF program
represented a sea change in how the government would provide
public benefits to the poor." In order to receive benefits, clients now

39

Jd

40 U.S.

Dep't of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., Food Stamp Program: FAQs,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/faqs.htm#20 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
41 Id.
42 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601(a)(1), 604 (2000).
43 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (1997)).
Section 116 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) officially terminated entitlement to benefits under the
"Aid to Families with Dependent Children" (AFDC) program. Pub. L. No. 104193, § 116(c), 110 Stat. 2105, 2184 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601
(2000)).
"Lens, Work Sanctions, supra note 1, at 255 ("The Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 radically
reshaped the landscape of welfare for women. The changes transformed a program
designed to meet the material needs of poor women and their families into one
primarily focused on preventing dependency through promoting work. PRWORA
includes an array of behavioral-based reforms that mandate work and penalize its
absence. One of the key tools for enforcing the work mandate is sanctions, which
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are required to search for work or attend drug counseling and
parenting classes. 45 If the client fails to show up for work, appear at
an appointment, or is terminated from her job and has no good cause
reason for lack of compliance, the state can impose sanctions against
her family that include reducing or terminating their welfare grant.4 6
A large number of administrative hearings are appeals by TANF
clients of sanctions imposed and the resulting loss of much-needed
income to the family.4 7
The SSI program was designed to provide a uniform minimum
level of income 48 to the elderly (individuals sixty-five years of age or
older), adults and children with disabilities, and people who are
blind.4 9 It was the first national program created by Congress to
insure that people whose income and assets are insufficient for
survival or whose Social Security payments do not cover essential
needs would have a guaranteed basic monthly income. Although the
benefits are quite small, the SSI program has been remarkably
successful in lifting our most vulnerable adults and children above
the poverty threshold.so The inappropriate termination of such
benefits thus thrusts these individuals back into poverty.

can include financial penalties. Women who do not comply with work rules can
lose all or some of their cash assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid.").
45
Id. at 269 n.93.
46
1Id. at 259-60. The authority for the imposition of sanctions against recipients
who do not meet the work requirements is at 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (2000).
47 See Lens, BureaucraticDisentitlement,supranote 9, at 27 n.84.
48 In 2007 the Federal SSI benefit level for a single person was $623 per
month. 20 C.F.R. § 416.410 (2007) (setting the level of benefits for 1996 postwelfare reform).
49 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (2000).
o Gay Gellhom, Disability and Welfare Reform: Keep the Supplemental
Security Income Programbut Reengineer the DisabilityDeterminationProcess, 22
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 961, 965-66 (1995) ("[T]he program has been effective since
its inception in closing the poverty gap for the vulnerable population of disabled
adults and children. Comparison of the pre-SSI poverty gap in 1973 with the
subsequent year under SSI showed that, in its first year, SSI eliminated 60% of the
preexisting poverty gap for the disabled. Another statistical study a decade later
analyzed 1990 data on the impact of the federal benefits program on the poverty
status of children. Although the percentage of children in families with income
under the poverty threshold had climbed to an alarming 22% in 1992, the number
would have been vastly higher without the payment of federal social security and
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Another crucial benefit provided by public assistance is health
care coverage. The primary needs-based public assistance program
that covers healthcare is Medicaid. Under Medicaid, eligible adult
recipients receive a package of benefits called "mandatory services"
that includes coverage of medically required emergency services,
hospitalization, ambulance, nursing services, rehabilitation (including
occupational and physical therapies), prescription medications and
skilled nursing home care. 52 Most states also provide recipients with
optional services that include home health coverage, durable medical
equipment, personal care, case management, medical transportation,
eye care, dental care and hearing aids.53
Eligible low-income children receive an even broader range of
medical care than adults.54 Under the Early Periodic Screening,
Diagnosis and Treatment Program ("EPSDT"), children get regular
check-ups and all medically necessary follow-up treatment for any
conditions that are discovered." Congress passed the EPSDT
program in recognition of the fact that children from poor families
are at higher risk of disabling health problems or death than children

SSI benefits. These programs raised 1.1 million children above the poverty level
and lessened the effects of poverty for 1.3 million more.") (citations omitted).
5' 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000).
52 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2000) (incorporating by reference 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17), (21) (2000)). See alsoNora Flaherty, Medicaid
"PreferredDrug Lists". Floridaas a Modelfor Analysis, 11 ELDER L.J. 77, 82
n.37 (2003).
1 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii). See also Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/home/medicaid.asp (last visited Feb.
11,2008).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) (2000) (incorporating by reference 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(r) (2000)).
55 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (2000). See also, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. 17, §
6802 (2005); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE, § 33.131 (2007); Official Washington State
DSHS Web Site for EPSDT,
http://wwwl.dshs.wa.gov/esa/EAZManual/Sections/HealthyKids.htm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2008); Texas DSHS Web Site for Texas Health Steps,
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/thsteps/default.shtm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008);
California Child Health and Disability Prevention Program Website,
http://www.dhs.ca.gov/pcfhl/cms/chdp/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
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living out of poverty. It sought to remedy this problem by providing a
broader package of health services and preventive care.5 6
The denial or termination of any one of these medical services
can be devastating. The stated purpose of the Medicaid Program is to
furnish "medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent
children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income
and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical
services."'7 Therefore, the loss of this benefit could mean that needy
children, elderly and disabled people would be unable to afford
medically required services. Without surgery or a prescription drug, a
Medicaid recipient may become disabled or die. A denial of home
personal care services can result in a person being unnecessarily
institutionalized in a nursing home. A person denied eye care or
hearing aide services loses the ability to see or hear. Someone denied
dental care may suffer in pain, lose teeth or forgo nutrition." Without
an appropriate wheelchair, a paraplegic may lose all mobility. The
anxiety and fear of losing medical benefits itself can cause lasting
mental health problems.
These possible results are not just hypothetical. They are
happening every day as benefits are cut in state after state.5 9 After a

56 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Health Res. and Servs. Admin.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/epsdt/overview.htm ("[T]he purpose of the EPSDT program is
'to discover, as early as possible, the ills that handicap our children' and to provide
'continuing follow up and treatment so that handicaps do not go neglected.' Federal
law-including statutes, regulations, and guidelines-requires that Medicaid cover a
very comprehensive set of benefits and services for children, different from adult
benefits. Since one in three U.S. children under age six is eligible for Medicaid,
EPSDT offers a very important way to ensure that young children receive
appropriate health, mental health, and developmental services.") (last visited Feb.
12, 2008).
57 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
8 See Kyung M. Song, Lack ofDental Care Leaves Poor in Agony, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at 1 ("[A]dvocates note that poor oral health is the root of a
host of life-threatening and expensive medical problems that contribute to an
overloaded health-care system."); Nicholas Bakalar, Dental Health: Treating Gum
DiseaseMay Ease Other Ailments, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2007, at F6; Mary Otto,
For Want of a Dentist, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at B 1 (telling story of a twelve
year-old boy who died from bacteria that spread from tooth to brain after family
lost its Medicaid benefits).
s1 In one case study, the government denied Medicaid coverage to "Michele,"
resulting in the hospitalization of her daughter with pneumonia, huge medical bills
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benefit is denied or a sanction imposed, the administrative hearing
system is almost always the final check on an agency seeking to take
away benefits that prevent malnutrition, illness, or even death. The
already great costs of a wrong decision are rendered even more
daunting by its finality.
When agency actions affect the lives of low-income families, the
first place to go for a resolution of the dispute is not the judiciary, but
to the executive branch's own court system - the administrative
hearing system. As I will show, appeals to judicial branch courts of
ALJs factual findings and legal conclusions are, available in theory,
but difficult if not impossible for clients to achieve in practice. While
all states are required to provide a judicial appeals process to clients
denied benefits in hearings, the appeals process is unfair for several
reasons: it is difficult for pro se appellants to navigate the procedures
to perfect an appeal to court; once in the judicial branch, the
reviewing court must defer to both the factual findings and legal
conclusions made by the agency; and the exhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine requires low-income clients to bring
their cases first in the administrative hearing setting. Together, these
procedural and practical hurdles mean that the administrative hearing
is, realistically, the only forum public assistance appellants have in
which to present their legal and factual case challenging the welfare
agency's decisions. Not only is the ALJ the trial judge and jury for
the poor, the agency hearing is effectively the only forum for appeals.

for her treatment, creditors calling the family day and night threatening jail time if
she did not pay off the bills, and eventual garnishment of her wages to pay the
medical debt. WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON CIVIL EQUAL
JUSTICE, WASHINGTON STATE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS 23 (Sept. 2003), availableat
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/taskforce/CivilLegalNeeds.pdf. In
2003, one in seven low-income households in Illinois experienced a legal problem
concerning public benefits (not including Medicaid, Medicare or other government
sponsored health benefits); the most common problem was applying for or
receiving food stamps; and 87.1% of public benefits legal needs were unmet. THE
LEGAL AID SAFETY NET: A REPORT ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME
ILLINOISANS 18, 20, 36 (Feb. 2005) (on file with author). See also STATE BAR OF
WISCONSIN, BRIDGING THE JUSTICE GAP: WISCONSIN'S UNMET LEGAL NEEDS 6

(Mar. 2007), availableat
http://www.wisbar.org/am/template.cftn?section=bridgingthe-justice-gap
(reporting that the reduction or loss of public benefits is one of the two most
frequently occurring legal problems facing the poor).
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It is particularly important, therefore, that the process minimize the
risks that a wrong decision poses to the claimant.
First, very few public assistance cases are appealed into the court
system.6 0 Public assistance appellants must raise their claims to
benefits first in the administrative process rather than going directly
into the independent judicial branch. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires all who dispute an agency action to
use the entire available administrative hearing process first before
filing in court. 6'
All fifty states are required by federal law to provide an
administrative mechanism for welfare recipients and applicants to
appeal agency decisions affecting their eligibility.62 There are two
basic administrative hearings structures in use for appeals of public
assistance benefits: the central panel system, in which the judges who
hear welfare agency appeals are employed by a separate and
independent agency;63 and the hearing examiner within the agency
system, in which those judges are employed directly by the same
agency that made the underlying decision.6 For programs that are

In Washington State in fiscal year 2006, only 29 cases out of the 1,765 final
administrative hearing decisions issued affirming the welfare agency's denial of
public assistance benefits were appealed by clients to the state court system. That
constitutes less than 2% of appealable cases. WA OAH Statistics, supra note 14.
61 See generally William Funk, Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies - New
Dimensions Since Darby, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing impact of
1993 Supreme Court decision limiting traditional rule governing exhaustion of
administrative remedies). The exhaustion doctrine has limited exceptions for
futility and irreparable harm. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146-48
(1992).
62 See supra note 8.
6 In 2007, 26 states, the District of Columbia, and two cities employed central
panels for some or all of their administrative agency hearings. They are: Alabama,
Florida, Massachusetts, Oregon, Alaska, Georgia, Michigan, South Carolina,
Arizona, Hawaii, Minnesota, Tennessee, California, Iowa, Missouri, Texas, City of
Chicago, New Jersey, Washington, Colorado, Louisiana, New York City,
Wisconsin, District of Columbia, Maine, North Carolina, Wyoming, Maryland, and
North Dakota. Nat'1 Ass'n of Admin. Law Judiciary,
http://www.naalj.org/panel.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
6 The state of Wisconsin is the only state where local agencies, rather than one
statewide agency, administer its TANF program. Appeals of local agency decisions
are heard by those, often private, agencies. Lens, BureaucraticDisentitlement,
supra note 9, at 40.
60
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administered solely by the federal government, such as SSI, hearings
are held by the internal Social Security hearing officers, not by a
separate and independent central panel.6 5
Although there is a legal process for appealing administrative
decisions to court, the reality is that the agency hearing decision is,
for the most part, the only and final appeal process available. A
number of obstacles present themselves to those who wish to appeal
to the federal court system, including the procedural difficulty of
navigating an appeal to the judicial branch, a lack of funds to pay an
attorney to perfect the appeal,66 the difficulty of perfecting service on
the agency, and the intimidation, as a pro se appellant, of facing an
assistant attorney general. While the volume of cases filed in the
Attempts at creating a central panel for federal agencies have failed over the
last two decades. See, e.g., Admin. Law Judge Corps Act: Hearingon H.R. 3910
Before the Subcomm. On Admin. Law and GovernmentalRelations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1992); Admin. Law Judge Corps
Act: Hearingon H.R. 1554 and H.R. 2726 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law
and GovernmentalRelations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-2 (1988).
66 There is no fight to publicly paid counsel in administrative hearings. For
example, in SSI and Social Security administrative hearings, the only obligation of
the Social Security Administration is to inform the appellant of the right to have
legal representation at the hearing, but there is no right to have it provided free of
charge and no requirement that the appellant appear with only a licensed attorney.
See Evangelista v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136, 142 (1 st Cir.
1987) ("[T]he applicable standard in these 'nonadversarial' proceedings is well
below the Sixth Amendment threshold."); Brandyburg v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 555,
562 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Clark v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1981)
("The Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional right to counsel at an
SSA hearing.")); Frank v. Chater, 924 F. Supp. 416, 422 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[a]s an
initial matter, it is necessary to clarify what the cases in this and other Circuits
casually refer to as the 'right to representation' in a benefits proceeding. This 'right'
does not rise to constitutional dimensions."). As a result, HHS is not obligated to
provide counsel for the claimant, Lopez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
728 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1984), or to "guarantee the availability of free legal
services," Clark v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1981). Rather, the "right
to representation" articulated in these cases refers to a claimant's freedom to choose
to be represented by counsel in a benefits proceeding. But see Lisa Brodoff, Susan
McClellan & Elizabeth Anderson, The ADA: One Avenue to Appointed Counsel
Before a Full Civil Gideon, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JusT. 609 (2004) (arguing that
the Americans with Disabilities Act requires an attorney accommodation in the
court or administrative hearing process when a litigant's disability prevents him or
her from accessing the court system).
65
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administrative system is overwhelming, 67 the number of public
assistance appeals taken into the judicial branch is relatively very
small. Statistics have not been compiled for all public benefits cases,
but in Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental
Security Income Disability cases in fiscal year 2005, trial-like
hearings in which the agency decides the facts and law of a case were
held in approximately 13% of cases. Only about 2% of those whose
cases were heard by an AU - or 0.3% of the total number of those
filing cases or having their eligibility reviewed - went on to appeal
their decisions to the federal court system. 69
Even for those who are able to get their case into the judicial
branch courts, those courts' review of the agency's factual findings is
very deferential, and the appellant's ability to introduce new evidence
6 The Social Security Administration, which administers both the Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income benefit, hears and decides more than
ten times the number of cases tried by all federal judges combined. RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMIN. L. TREATISE § 9.10, at 693 (4th ed. 2002). In fiscal year 2005
over 500,000 Social Security and SSI claimants had their appeals heard by ALJs.
See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 12, at 91. In that same year
12,360 cases were appealed to the federal courts. Id. In Washington State alone,
11,722 public assistance hearing requests were filed in fiscal year 2005. WA OAH
Statistics, supra note 14.
68 SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, supranote 12, at 91 (showing that in
fiscal year 2005 in DI and SSI Disability cases, 2,570,831 initial claims were filed
and 1,518,235 continuing disability reviews took place; there were ALI
dispositions of 509,390 of the initial claims and 14,972 of the continuing disability
reviews). In Washington State, of the 11,722 hearing requests filed, only 1,736
(15%) went to a full administrative hearings. WA OAH Statistics, supra note 14.
69 Statistics are only available nationally on appeals of Social Security and SSI
disability claims, not on all welfare appeals. Even there, where attorney
representation is common, only 2.3% appeal to federal court after a hearing
decision denying benefits. SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 12, at
91 (showing that while a total of 4,089,066 initial claims and continuing disability
reviews were processed in fiscal year 2005, there were only 12,360 federal court
decisions on appeals from agency dispositions of these cases). In Washington State,
of the 1,736 hearings held, the agency decision denying benefits was only reversed
292 times (in other words, the appellant won 16% of the time). WA OAH
Statistics, supra note 14. In all of fiscal year 2005, there were only twenty-nine
appeals taken into the court system by low-income clients (less than 2% of the total
number who received an adverse final decision from the agency). Id. These
numbers are even more striking when one considers that over 11,000 hearing
requests were filed initially: about 0.25% of those claimants eventually had their
cases heard in state court. Id.
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is extremely limited. The standard of review for determining the
validity of facts (the who, what, when, where, how, and credibility
determinations) is the "substantial evidence test."7 0 The reviewing
court will determine if there was some evidence in the record that
would allow a reasonable person to reach the ALJs finding.7 ' Even if
the weight of the evidence favors the public assistance appellant's
version of the facts, the judicial branch court cannot overturn the

See, e.g., TExAS GOVT CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(E) (2000) (a court may
not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the state agency on the weight of the
evidence on questions committed to agency discretion but shall reverse or remand
the case for further proceedings if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the
reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole); COLO. REv. STAT. CODE
ANN. § 24-4-106-7 (Court shall affirm agency findings if supported by substantial
evidence); WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.570(3)(e) (2003) ("The order is not
supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court, which includes the agency record for judicial review,
supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court under this
chapter"); CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 3 ADMIN. L. & PRAc. § 10.9 (2d ed. 1997)
("substantial evidence means that the record contains enough evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's conclusions").
n1See Goshen Irrigation Dist. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Control, 926 P.2d 943,
951 (Wyo. 1996); Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of Tax Comm'n, 922 P.2d
758, 767 (Utah 1996); Qualman v. State, Dept. of Employment, 922 P.2d 389, 392
(Idaho 1996); Fitzhugh v. New Mexico Dept. of Labor, 922 P.2d 555, 562 (N.M.
1996). See also WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.570(3)(e) (2003) ("The order is not
supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court, which includes the agency record for judicial review,
supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court under this
chapter").
70
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finding.7 2 And unless there are exceptional circumstances, no new
trial is held, and no additional evidence is taken.7 3
The ability to raise new legal issues on review is also limited.74
The judicial branch court sits as an appellate court. The judge
reviews the written transcript of the administrative hearing, all the
exhibits, and the AL's written findings of fact and conclusions of
law. A public assistance appellant must not only be savvy enough to
have put on all the testimony and exhibits necessary for the ALJ to
make favorable factual findings, she must also have spotted and
raised all the legal arguments and defenses she could have at the
hearing, because she will have almost no opportunity to correct any
mistakes in court. 75 Even if the appellant is able to raise all the
72 The Supreme Court has interpreted the substantial evidence standard to be
extremely deferential. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMIN. L. TREATISE § 11.2
(2007 Cum. Supp.); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S.
292, 300 (1939) ("Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more
than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established."); Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (stating that "substantial evidence"
is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion"); Universal Camera v. NLRB 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951)
(holding that if an agency's finding is supported by substantial evidence a court will
intervene only in the rare instance when the standard has been misapprehended or
grossly misapplied).
7 See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-49 (West 2007) (no new evidence
allowed on judicial review unless material to the issues, not cumulative, and could
not have reasonably been presented at the administrative hearing); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 34.05.554 (2003) (strict limitations on raising new issues); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 34.05.558 (2003) (judicial review of facts confined to record);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 34.05.562 (2003) (strict limitations on admission of new
evidence); Johnson v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Judicial review
of the administrative law judge's decision is limited to an evaluation of that
decision .... A trial de novo is improper."); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231
(2d Cir. 1980) (noting that if the agency "has applied proper legal principles,
judicial review is limited to an assessment of whether the findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence").
7
4 But see Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 112 (2000) (holding that Social
Security claimant does not waive judicial review by failing to present issue in
request for review because issue exhaustion is not required by regulations or statute
and non-adversarial administrative proceeding is unlike court proceeding).
7 See Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kaflka: The Misapplicationof the
Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to InquisitorialAdministrative Proceedings,97 COLUM.
L. REv. 1289, 1323-25 (1997) (arguing that issue exhaustion is inappropriate in an
administrative setting where most appellants are either unrepresented or
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appropriate legal issues at the administrative level, convincing a court
to overturn the agency's legal interpretations will be difficult because
of the deference courts give to an agency's permissible construction
of its governing statutes.7 6
In these cases with potentially grave consequences, then, the
ALJ's decision is likely to be either actually or effectively the last
word. With so much at stake when an agency makes the wrong
decision, it is imperative that the hearing system be designed to guard
against wrongful denials and err on the side of eligibility.
B. Administrative HearingsAre Unfair Forumsfor Public
Assistance Appellants
Under the current administrative hearing system, public
assistance appellants are at a significant disadvantage when faced
with the resources and power of the state." Even in central panel
states, where the agency hearing the case is distinct from the original

represented by non-attorneys and where the ALJ theoretically shares responsibility
for raising issues).
* See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (holding that where a "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute").
7 In Washington State, of the 11,722 appeals of denials of public benefits filed
in fiscal year 2005, 9,140 appellants either defaulted or withdrew their requests.
WA OAH statistics, supra note 14. Of the 1,736 hearings held, only 292 appellants
prevailed, or 16% of those that went to hearing. Id. A recent study of TANF
sanction hearings in Texas, New York, and Wisconsin, the first study of welfare
administrative hearings since welfare reform, revealed that appeal rates were very
low, at 0.29%, 4.6%, and 0.46%, respectively. Lens, BureaucraticDisentitlement,
supra note 9, at 42. Clients withdrew their requests in 13 to 24% of cases and
appeals were dismissed for nearly half of cases in Texas and New York (only 15%
in Wisconsin) because clients failed to appear for the hearing. Id. at 45-46.
Notably, those appellants who make it all the way through the hearing process are
relatively successful, obtaining reversals of the sanction between 40% and 80% of
the time. Id. at 46. However, the data showed that very few clients requested
hearings and "a disturbing trend ... is the percentage of clients who abandon their
requests for a hearing, especially in Texas and New York, where nearly half of
clients do not follow through with a hearing ...... "Id. at 49. Other than these
TANF sanction hearing statistics and the Washington State OAH statistics, I could
find no statistics on the reversal rates for clients who appeal Medicaid, Food
Stamps, and other types of assistance in other jurisdictions.
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agency deciding the case, there are huge barriers for appellants to
overcome if they are to prevail in their attempt to obtain or maintain
their benefits. The central panel hearing system was developed as a
way for states both to create an adjudicatory process that appeared
less biased and more equitable and to save taxpayer dollars." State
administrative law judges who had each previously been housed,
trained, and funded by one of the numerous state agencies
individually were all drawn into a separate hearings agency. Under
this system, judges could be trained to hear several different types of
cases and could more efficiently and effectively respond to the
changing hearing needs of government. Also, once the adjudicatory
function was severed from the executive agency that made the initial
decision, the hearing participants would have greater confidence that
the hearing officer would decide the case independently and fairly. 9
Because central panel systems appear to be the most fair to
appellants, in that the agency deciding the issue is separate from the
welfare department initially denying benefits,80 I will focus on that
system. For as I will demonstrate in this subsection, even in that
"independent" hearing system, appellants are at a steep disadvantage.
They face a panoply of problems: their lack of legal representation;
the complexity of the hearing system in general and public assistance
law in particular; the effects of poverty, limited education, and
disabling health conditions on their ability to argue a case; the
inability to speak English; the inaccessibility of records needed to put
on a case; the requirement that the hearing officer apply the lowest
level of law rather than higher authority; the generally progovernment culture of ALJs; and biases held by judges against
people in poverty.

1 See Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creatinga State Central
HearingAgency: Promises,PracticalProblems, and a Proposalfor Change, 53
ADMIN. L. REv. 475, 479-81 (2001); John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel
Movement: A Work In Progress,53 ADMIN. L. REv. 419, 421-30 (2001).
79 See McNeil, supra note 78, at 479 ("The promise of a central panel is that
the forum for litigating these policy-driven issues will be fair in both appearance
and reality."); Hardwicke, supra note 78, at 424-25 (discussing independent and
objective judgment as the dominant goal of the central panel movement).
so Frank Sullivan, Jr., Some Questions to ConsiderBefore IndianaCreatesa
CentralizedOffice ofAdministrative Hearings,38 IND. L. REv. 389, 392 (2005).
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First, the vast majority of public assistance appellants appear at
their hearings pro se."' It goes without saying that representing
oneself, even for people with an advanced degree and adequate
financial resources, is a daunting proposition. 82 When a pro se
litigant's income, assets, healthcare and well-being are on the line, he
or she faces formidable emotional barriers to articulating a clear case
and proving facts. In the best circumstances it is difficult to keep a
clear head and an objective view of the strengths and weaknesses of
the case. Even a lawyer who represents himself "has a fool for a
client."
Despite the fact that administrative hearings are not as formal as
hearings held by judges in court, the administrative hearing process is
difficult for appellants to navigate. 83 It can be a scary, intimidating,
81In Washington State in fiscal year 2006, for example, only 16% of public
assistance appellants appeared at their hearings represented by counsel. WA OAH
statistics, supra note 14. Deborah L. Rhode states that, in civil proceedings, most
low- and middle-income people lack any affordable access to legal services, and
that about "four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and ... two- to threefifths of the needs of middle-income individuals remain unmet." Rhode, Access to
Justice, supra note 12, at 1785. "The nation has only about one legal aid lawyer or
public defender for every 4,300 persons below the poverty line compared with a
ratio of one lawyer for every 380 Americans in the population generally." Id. at
1788. In Washington state, a recent study found that 87% of low-income
households experience a civil legal problem each year, 8%experience a public
benefits problem, and 88% of low-income people face their legal problems without
help from an attorney. WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON
CIVIL EQUAL JUSTICE FUNDING, CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY: EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/taskforce/legalneedsexecsummary.pdf.
See also UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, THE JUSTICE GAP: THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF
LOW-INCOME UTAHNS 15 (Apr. 2007), availableat http://www.uls.state.ut.us/

(follow "The Justice Gap: The Unmet Legal Needs of Low-Income Utahns"
hyperlink) (stating that in 2004-2005, 8.8% of low-income Utah households with
public services legal issues sought legal aid, compared with 18.4% of low-income
households that experienced some sort of legal need.).
82 See Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value of Counsel: 20 Years of
RepresentationBefore a Public Housing Eviction Board,26 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
627, 650 (1992) (showing that the more legally formal the hearing, the more likely
representation helped the client prevail); Swank, supra note 23, at 1548 (noting that
even those who elect to represent themselves demand more time and resources
from the courts than those represented by counsel).
83See Lens, BureaucraticDisentitlement,supra note 9, at 34 ("Virtually from
the time fair hearings were suggested as an antidote to bureaucratic excess or
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and complex process that involves court-like procedures, public
speaking, motion practice, entry of exhibits, objections to evidence,
and an understanding of complicated laws and procedures. 84
Appellants must master all of this in front of an adversary who knows
the law and the procedures, and a judge who expects that the parties
will be able to put on a case.8 5

errors, commentators have expressed doubts that clients would use the fair hearing
process, or use it well. The reasons cited vary, ranging from the practical to the
philosophical, from bureaucratic limitations to client limitations."); Matthew Diller,
The Revolution in Welfare Administration:Rules, Discretion,andEntrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1192-1193 (2000) ("[O]bservers have
pointed out that the protections accorded by individual administrative hearings are
frequently an inadequate means of redressing unfair and inequitable administration
even in individual cases. A
system that relies on individuals to come forward and assert grievances
presupposes that individuals have knowledge of their rights, can identify wrongs,
and are aware of the remedies. Each of these conditions is frequently lacking in the
public benefit programs arena."); Wash. State Office for Admin. Hearings,
Glossary for Admin. Hearings, available at http://www.oah.wa.gov/glossary.shtml
(last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
84 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.446 (2003) (describing procedures for
subpoenas, discovery and protective orders); id. § 34.05.452 (describing rules of
evidence and cross examination procedures). See generally PETER L. STRAUSS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 143-48 (1989)
(providing descriptive overview of on-the-record hearings); Jerry L. Mashaw, The
ManagementSide ofDue Process:Some Theoreticaland Litigation Notes on the
Assurance ofAccuracy, Fairnessand Timeliness in the Adjudication ofSocial
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 811 (1974) ("Although general

information about AFDC may be widespread, specific knowledge which would
suggest a challenge to bureaucratic judgments is not widely held."). The ALJ has a
panoply ofjudge-like powers, including the ability to issue subpoenas, rule on
offers of proof, receive evidence, and conduct settlement conferences. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(c) (2000).
85 See Vargas v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 838 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1988)
(rejecting pro se claimant's contention that ALJ did not do enough to help her
develop her record when she did not understand the need for additional evidence).
Courts agree that attorney representation in the context of establishing eligibility
for SSI and Social Security Disability can be critical to obtaining benefits. See
Frank v. Charter, 924 F. Supp. 416, 427-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The potential
benefits of having counsel at a benefits proceeding are well recognized. Indeed, the
heightened duty placed on the ALJ by this Circuit is an attempt to compensate for
the disadvantage of proceeding without counsel .... The high rate of remand may
well be a function of the fact that, '[u]nder our system of adjudication, no hearing
officer (or judge) will ever be an equivalent substitute for a lawyer devoted
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Ironically, the same traits that cause people to need public
assistance - poverty, advanced age, or disability - can also seriously

disadvantage them in hearings. Poverty can prevent low-income
appellants from perfecting and arguing their appeals in several ways.
For example, TANF clients who have failed to comply with the work
search rules because of poor health or disability, or who lack access
to transportation and are subsequently sanctioned will presumably
experience the same obstacles in attending hearings. 86 Low-income
appellants can also have difficulty finding and paying for childcare,
so their young children commonly attend their hearings. As a result,
they often cannot present their cases in the best light because they
must simultaneously supervise their children's behavior. Poverty can
also mean a lack of good nutrition, inadequate housing or no housing
at all, and other stresses that make the presentation of legal and
factual issues at a hearing yet more difficult.8 7
People living in poverty are statistically much more likely to be at
an educational disadvantage as well. Even before the hearing

exclusively to a party's interests. Cases such as the present one will repeatedly arise
until the legal services bar translates into action the now commonplace observation
that agency cases are usually won or lost at the agency level."') (citing Guzman v.
Califano, 480 F. Supp. 735, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
" See Lens, Work Sanctions, supra note 1, at 264 ("Several studies have
demonstrated that clients' reasons for noncompliance are frequently linked to their
disadvantaged status, or obstacles that interfere with work. For example, in
California, a survey of local county welfare offices and advocacy groups listed
illness or a disability (84%), followed by a lack of transportation (70%) and then
child care (42%), as the most common reasons why clients were unable to comply
with the work rules. In New York, recipients reported lack of transportation or
child care, illness, or the need to care for a sick relative as the most common
reasons for why they failed to comply. Similarly, a survey of sanctioned families in
Utah revealed that a third of families cited health problems as the reason they did
not comply. In Iowa, the three most common reasons cited by clients for not
complying with the work rules were a serious personal issue or health problems
(29.6%), a lack of transportation (27.8%), and a lack of child care (20.4%).")
(citations omitted).
87 Cf Mashaw, supra note 84, at 812 ("[It is not] realistic to view a claimant
who may be chronically dependent as prepared to fight city hall even when basic
entitlement to benefits is at issue.").
88 SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI, WORK AND BARRIERS TO WORK AMONG WELFARE
RECIPIENTS (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/310836.html
(stating that according to the National Survey for American Families conducted by
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begins, lack of education sets clients up for failure. Not only must
they deal with sophisticated legal issues in front of an ALJ who is a
lawyer, they are also opposed by a department representative who is
usually college educated and who has received training on legal
representation and welfare program eligibility.8 9
Appellants with physical or mental disabilities experience
enormous added challenges in the hearing process.90 Their inability
to see or hear adequately affects their ability to obtain and provide
information to the hearing officer or agency. 9' Persons with mental
retardation or other developmental disabilities may be completely
unable to comprehend their hearing issues, let alone represent
themselves at the hearing. 92 Yet they are required to do just that
because there is no established right to counsel in this context, even

the Urban Institute, 41.8% of welfare recipients lacked a high school diploma in
2002).
89 See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
90

See, e.g., WASHINGTON STATE ACCESS TO JUSTICE BOARD IMPEDIMENTS
COMMIssION, ENSURING EQUAL ACCESS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A GUIDE
FOR WASHINGTON COURTS (Aug. 2006), availableat
http://www.wsba.org/atj/ensuringaccessguidebook.pdf; Jo WILLIAMS, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COMMUNICATION ACCESSIBILITY INTHE COURTS
(2002), availableat http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/CSADAAccFairnessPub.pdf; OFFICE OF THE FLORIDA STATE COURTS
ADMINISTRATOR, ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
RENEWING THE JUDICIAL BRANCH COMMITMENT (2006), availableat
http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public/pubs/bin/accesstocourts.pdf; JUDICIAL BRANCH
OF GEORGIA ON COURTROOM ACCESSIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
(2004), availableat http://www.georgiacourts.org/agencies/gcafc/handbook-

intro.html#main.
91

See WASHINGTON STATE ACCESS TO JUSTICE BOARD IMPEDIMENTS

COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 15-24.
92 See Hines v. Bowen, 671 F. Supp 10, 12 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that plaintiff
raised a colorable constitutional claim that he suffered from a mental incapacity
which rendered the notice provided by the Secretary inadequate); Manning v. Sec'y

of HHS., No. 83 CV 1782, 1985 WL 71751, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1985)
(stating that claimant presented a colorable argument that she failed to understand
and act upon the notice she received because of her mental condition); Brittingham
v. Schweiker, 558 F. Supp. 60, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (examining issue of whether
plaintiff had colorable claim based on inability to understand administrative appeal
procedures due to mental illness). Richard McNally, Autism and the Courts,
DISABILITIES PROJECT NEWSLETTER (State Bar of MI), Dec. 2005, availableat

http://www.michbar.org/programs/Disabilitiesnews_5.html.
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when the extent of a person's disability or illness clearly prevents her
from having the stamina or mental acuity to put on a case. 93
Appellants who do not speak English are at a special
disadvantage in the hearing process. Even assuming excellent
translation services, unrepresented non-English speaking appellants
can have difficulty understanding the administrative hearing system,
the law that applies, and how to present their case. 94 Both the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court have held
that Constitutional Due Process does not require welfare agencies to
give written notices of benefits terminations and reductions in a
language other than English. 95 In the cases giving rise to those
opinions, Spanish-speaking welfare and SSI recipients received
notices, written in English, that terminated their benefits. 96 They
failed to make timely requests for hearings challenging the denials,
and as a result, they immediately lost both their benefits and the right
to appeal.9 7 Similarly, in some states, the hearings office refuses to
provide a written translation of the administrative hearing decision in
the appellants' native language, opting instead to have the translated
decision read to the appellant over the phone. 98 Hearing decisions can

93 There is currently no right to paid counsel in the administrative hearing
setting. See supra note 66.
94
See generally Daniel J. Rearick, Reaching Out to the Most Insular
Minorities:A Proposalfor Improving Latino Access to the American Legal System,
39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 543 (2004).
9 Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 43 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("A rule placing
the burden of diligence and further inquiry on the part of a non-English-speaking
individual served in this country with a notice in English does not violate any
principle of due process."); Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 833 (Cal. 1973)
("[A]lthough in appropriate cases the use of Spanish in these and similar notices
would be desirable and should be encouraged, it does not rise to the level of a
constitutional imperative.").
96 Sobreal-Perez,717 F.2d at 37; Guerro, 512 P.2d at 834.
97

Id.

See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-02-0150 (1) (2005) ("When an
interpreter is used at a hearing, the ALJ must explain that the decision is written in
English but that a party using an interpreter may contact the interpreter for an oral
translation of the decision at no cost to you."); 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 357.4 10 (a)
(2007) ("The Texas Department of Human Services (DHS) shall provide a
translated coversheet in Spanish for hearing decisions where an interpreter was
used. The coversheet will include a short translated statement regarding the
outcome of the hearing and instruct the appellant to call the hearing officer if he
98
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be complicated documents that include multiple findings of fact and
conclusions of law and cite to many applicable statutes and
regulations. As a matter of common sense, it is virtually impossible
to figure out how to appeal such a complex decision if the only way
to review it is by listening to it over the phone. This feat would be
difficult for an attorney, let alone a lay person who has no legal
training and who cannot speak or read the language of the decision.
Public assistance appellants face disadvantages in the hearing
process beyond those created by poverty, disability, age, education,
or language. They are disadvantaged by the fact that the state is
always represented by an experienced advocate in the hearing. 99 In
most states, the agency denying benefits is represented at welfare
hearings either by a trained "fair hearing coordinator," by an in-house
attorney, program manager or supervisor, or by the Attorney
General's Office.oo Even fair hearing coordinators, though not
attorneys, are sophisticated in their ability to represent the client

needs assistance to understand the decision. An appellant who indicates by
telephone or in person, or in writing that assistance is needed to understand the
decision shall receive an explanation of the hearing decision from bilingual
personnel within a reasonable period of time.").
99 For example, in Oregon, the agency is represented by either an attorney or
an agency representative. See Oregon Office of Admin. Hearings, Representing
Yourself, http://www.oregon.gov/OAH/RepresentingYourself.shtml (last visited
Feb. 12, 2008). In Texas, the agency is usually represented by a state-employed
attorney. See Texas State Office of Admin. Hearings, Frequently Asked Questions
about SOAH, http://www.soah.state.tx.us/AboutUs/faq.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2008). In North Carolina, the agency is always represented by an attorney. See
North Carolina Office of Admin. Hearings, Hearings-Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.oah.state.nc.us/hearings/faq.html#31 (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
100For example, in California, the government is represented by an "Appeals
Officer." See LEGAL SERVICES OF CA, REPRESENTING YOURSELF AT HEARING:

TIPS TO SUCCEED (2004), availableat http://www.lsnc.net/factsheets/selfrepblank.pdf. In Illinois, the agency is represented at the hearing by the
caseworker supervisor. See Illinois Legal Aid, Appealing a Decision by the Illinois
Dep't of Human Services,
http://www.illinoislegalaid.org/index.cfn?fuseaction=home.dspcontent&contentlD
-4129 (last visited on Feb. 12, 2008). In Washington State, "fair hearing
coordinators" represent the agency in all public assistance cases except Medical
Assistance. See Welfare Rights Organizing Coalition, A Self-Help Guide to Fair
Hearings, http://www.wroc.org/factsheets/fairhearing.htrn (last visited Feb. 12,
2008). In those hearings, the agency is represented by in house attorneys.
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agency.101 They receive training on the fair hearing process,
development and presentation of evidence, arguing the law, and
prehearing motion practice.' 0 2 Having done numerous hearings on a
daily or weekly basis, they know the judges who hear the cases and
are very familiar with the hearing format. Unlike their pro se
opponent, they also know how to access the statutes, regulations and
internal manuals governing benefits programs. 10 3 The government's
representatives can easily acquire the prior decisions of the particular
ALJ assigned to the case or other hearing decisions on the issue at
hand to predict the outcome of the case and strategically develop
their arguments. On the other hand, the pro se appellant has little
opportunity to educate herself about the law in this area since ALJ
decisions have no precedential value and, in any case, are not usually
published.' 0 4
But even if pro se appellants could get access to prior decisions
and law, it would do them little good because public benefits law is
so complex that it is virtually unreadable by the lay person. The
federal and state Medicaid statutes have been described as "almost

101

See, e.g., HUMAN SERVICES COUNCIL, JOB DESCRIPTION, availableat

http://www.humanservicescouncil.com/docs/fairhearingCMDescO914.pdf
(describing duties of Fair Hearings Coordinator in Washington State) [hereinafter
JOB DESCRIPTION]; DSHS, ELIGIBILITY A-Z MANUAL,
http://wwwl.dshs.wa.gov/esa/eazmanual/sections/FHcoordRole.htm (last visited on
Feb. 12, 2008) (same).
102
See, e.g., PRELIMINARY INFORMATION: OMDR/DD MEDICAID STATE
HEARING TRAINING SEMINARS FOR COUNTY BOARDS OF MRDD, availableat

http://odmrdd.state.oh.us/training/docs/MedicaidState-agenda.pdf (outlining
training program for Ohio hearing coordinators); C.J.WITHEROW, COMMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH PARTNERSHIP OF SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN GRIEVANCE &
APPEALS TRAINING FOR PROVIDER STAFF, availableat

http://ewashtenaw.org/govenment/departments/cmhpsm/providerinformation/Pro
vider/o2OTraining%2OResources/Grie%2OAppeTrain.pdf (outlining training for
Southeastern Michigan hearing coordinators).
103 See JOB DESCRIPTION, supra note 101.

'0 The doctrine of stare decisis is generally not applicable to administrative
proceedings. 2 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 5.67(4) (2d ed. 1997). Neither agencies nor
the courts are bound by previous agency decisions. Id. See also Texas v. United
States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556 (5th Cir. 1989) ("An agency ... is not bound by the
shackles of stare decisis to follow blindly the interpretations that it, or the courts of
appeals, have adopted in the past.").
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unintelligible to the uninitiated," 05 as "labyrinthinan,"' 0 6 and as the
regulatory equivalent of the "Serbonian bog." 07 Appellants' likely
inability to decipher the law, assuming they can find it, puts them at a
major disadvantage against the trained agency representative.
The agency has another advantage in the hearing process when
expert witnesses are needed to prove a claim. Welfare agencies can
and do call their own doctors, dentists, nurses, and program
managers, to testify as paid experts as to why the appellant does not
meet physical or mental disability standards, why the requested
service is not medically necessary, or why program rules prohibit
eligibility. The appellant must figure out how to cross examine these
state-employed experts on her own, with no expert testifying on her
behalf to counter the opinion put forth.'o 8 Finding and hiring expert
witnesses who can testify to such issues as the medical disability of
the applicant, the need for medications or equipment, or the financial
value of assets is difficult at best for low-income appellants in the
hearing process. Yet, this expert testimony can be the decisive
evidence in a benefits eligibility case.109
Many agencies now require that appellants rely not on the
medical opinion of their own doctors for proof of their need for
services but on double-blind research studies. 1 o As resources have
Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.).
Roloff v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 333, 340, n.12 (7th Cir. 1992).
07
Cherry v. Magnant 832 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 n.4 (S.D. Ind. 1993). See JOHN
MILTON, PARADISE LOST book 2, lines 592-94, at 183 (Roy Flanagan ed.,
Macmillan Publishing Co. 1993) (1667) ("A gulf profound, as that Serbonian bog
Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old, Where armies whole have sunk.").
"os See, e.g., DSHS Hearings Guide, http://www.oah.wa.gov/DSHS.shtml (last
visited Feb. 12, 2008); Representing Yourself in a DDS Hearing (2003),
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/forms/fair&/o20Hearing%20Brochure%202
003 - 11-1 9.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (explaining that although evidence may
be presented by claimant in the form of letters or written statements, it is generally
more convincing to have expert witnesses present at the hearing, and also noting
that expert witnesses often require a fee to appear at the hearing).
09
' See, e.g., A.M.L. v. Dep't of Health and Health Care Fin., 863 P.2d 44, 48
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the opinion of a Medicaid recipient's treating
physicians as to the medical necessity of breast reduction surgery must be given
deference and cannot be overridden by agency experts without a "reasoned basis"
for decision).
"o See e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-144 (2004) (requiring, under the state's
new definition of Medical Necessity, that Medicaid clients prove that the benefits
1os

1o6
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become scarcer, state governments have developed more
sophisticated requirements for proving the medical necessity of
medical services, equipment, and prescription drugs."' Where once
an appellant could prove her need for services by obtaining a
supportive letter from her doctor, now sophisticated medical and
statistical research may be required to prove her eligibility." 2 For the
unrepresented public assistance appellant, this can be an
insurmountable obstacle to winning at the hearing.
Inability to access even ordinary financial and medical records
needed to prove eligibility for public benefits is a large stumbling
block for welfare clients in hearings." 3 Welfare clients bear the
burden of documenting income, assets, family status, and medical
need." 4 It is difficult for low-income clients to obtain the information
they need to prove eligibility. They must be able to travel to banks,

of the requested service outweigh the medical risks based on "scientifically
supported evidence"); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-501-0165 (2005) (state Medicaid
regulation requiring that patients prove the efficacy of requested services with a
"hierarchy of evidence" including controlled studies, "strong scientific literature",
and "well-designed clinical trials").
'" See generally Jennifer K. Squillario, Medicaidand DurableMedical
Equipment: An OngoingBattle Between Expense and Health, 59 MD. L. REv. 669
(2000).
11
2Id. at 692 ("The most glaring detriment of the standard is the burden it
places on the Medicaid beneficiary to show, through statistical evidence, that the
DME provides a benefit to the Medicaid population as a whole."). See also
Analysis ofProposed TennCareDefinition ofMedical Necessity (2004),
http://www.healthlaw.org/search/item.70582-Analysis-ofProposed- TennCare_
Definition ofMedicalNecessity-June -04 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (arguing that
the state's new definition of medical necessity creates "a nearly insurmountable
burden for patients seeking care . . .").
" See Lens, FairHearingRoom, supra note 28, at 324-28 ("Documentation,
or the reduction of every transaction into a written form that stands for the actual
event, is the sine qua non of bureaucracies. Writings take on a rarified role in a
bureaucracy. They are imbued with a misplaced objectivity and solidity .... Their
existence puts [welfare appellants] at a distinct disadvantage. First, they must
overcome this reification of documents, their status as unassailable fact. Then
clients must be able to gather their own written and credible version of events ....
Despite their efforts, clients, unlike workers, are not used to documenting every
interaction. They also have less access to the types of proof that are valued.").
114 See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(f)(5)(i) (2003) ("The household has primary
responsibility for providing documentary evidence to support statements on the
application and to resolve any questionable information.").
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doctors' offices and former employers for records." 5 In addition, they
may require computer access. Many appellants simply do not have
the required level of sophistication to track down the information that
they need.
Perhaps surprisingly, it is the government, not the low-income
client, that has the best access to the appellant's own records, files,
and evidence in a public assistance appeal. With release forms signed
by the client, which are a condition precedent to receiving public
benefits," 6 the state can electronically cross-check client bank
records, real property, credit reports, debt, medical records, tax
returns, and employment records."' 7 Agencies have the power to
subpoena medical and financial records" 8 and can cross-check their
computer records with those of the Internal Revenue Service, Social
Security, and Employment Security." 9 The government, in sum, has
the staff and resources to access these critical records.
The state is in a superior position relative to low-income
appellants for another important reason: it writes the very rules that

11 See generally WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-490-0005 (2005) (listing the types
of information applicants for cash, medical, or food programs must submit to verify
eligibility).
116 Public assistance applicants and recipients must give the government free
access to all medical and financial private records so that the agency can verify that
the client is eligible for benefits. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-490-0005(9)
(2005).
117 Government welfare programs use computer matching as a check on clients'
program eligibility. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEHS-00-1 19,

BENEFIT AND LOAN PROGRAMS: IMPROVED DATA SHARING COULD ENHANCE
PROGRAM INTEGRITY 25-30 (2000),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he0o19.pdf, WILLIAM S.
BORDEN & ROBBI L. RUBEN-URM, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AN ASSESSMENT OF
COMPUTER-MATCHING IN THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM (2002).
11 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2).

See generally Amy Mulzer, The Doorkeeper and the GrandInquisitor: The
CentralRole of Verification Proceduresin Means-Tested Welfare Programs,36
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 663, 672-73 (2005) ("[there is an] increased use of

'computer-matching' as a primary means of verification. Instead of requesting paper
documentation of income, or carrying out a home visit or collateral contact,

workers using computer-matching check information reported in public and private
databases.").
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determine who gets benefits and who does not.120 The state can also
modify and clarify its rules if it believes that ALJs have
misinterpreted them in granting eligibility. The ability to write and
amend eligibility rules is advantageous to the state for more than just
the obvious reason that the state can control the outcome via
rulemaking. In contrast to the normal judicial process, in the
administrative hearing process agency regulations are the primary
source of law that must be applied by the hearing judge. Regulations
take precedence over higher conflicting authority in statutes, case
law, and even state and federal constitutions. 121 While agencies do
not have the authority to promulgate regulations that violate statutory
or constitutional mandates, it is hardly unprecedented for an agency
to overreach in regulating, only to be found to have exceeded its
authority by a reviewing court.122 Such arguments will not, however,
Agencies have broad authority under enabling legislation and under the
statutes authorizing the various public assistance programs to write regulations
setting out eligibility requirements. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
121Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Once an
agency has ruled on a given matter, . . . it is not open to reargument by the
administrative law judge; . . , although an administrative law judge on occasion
may privately disagree with the agency's treatment of a given problem, it is not his
proper function to express such disagreement in his published rulings or
decisions.") (citing Joseph Zwerdling, Reflections on the Role of an Administrative
Law Judge, 25 ADMIN. L. REV. 9, 12-13 (1973)). A number of states expressly
incorporate such a rule into their statutes or regulations. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 388-02-0220 (2005) (stating that an ALJ must first apply the welfare
agency's regulations and can only look to higher authority if there is no rule
covering the issue); 1 TEXAS ADMIN. CODE § 357.483(d) (2007) ("The judge has no
authority to declare state statutes or rules, or federal statutes or regulations,
invalid"); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11340.1 ("It is the intent of the Legislature that neither the Office of
Administrative Law nor the court should substitute its judgment for that of the
rulemaking agency as expressed in the substantive content of adopted
regulations."); 10 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 2505-10-8.057.8.D-2505-10-8.057.8E
(stating that ALJs are bound by agency regulations and shall have no jurisdiction to
determine the constitutionality or legality of regulations). The same is true for
federal agency judges. See, e.g., Nat'1 Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785,
789 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that if the agency is bound by an interpretative rule
or statement of policy, its ALJs should be bound as well).
122 See, e.g., Ohison v. Weil, 953 P.2d 939 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
welfare agency's regulation denying coverage of a body brace violated Medicaid
statute); Jenkins v. Washington State Dep't of Social and Health Servs.,157 P.3d
120
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be countenanced by the hearing judge when raised by a public
assistance appellant. This requirement that administrative judges treat
agency-promulgated regulations, the lowest level of law, as the
highest level of authority is unique to the public assistance hearing.
In no other setting in American law are litigants essentially barred
from enjoying the benefit of favorable statutes, case law and
constitutions in making their arguments to the primary judge
deciding their case. 2 3 Even assuming that an unrepresented person
could figure out that a rule applied in terminating, reducing, or
denying her public assistance was unconstitutional or violated the
agency's authorizing statute, she could not successfully make that
challenge at the administrative level.
The only way a public assistance appellant can challenge an
illegal regulation is by appealing her case all the way through the
administrative process up to the court system, and there arguing the
issue. But as discussed above, most public assistance clients never
get beyond the hearing itself in challenging the agency decision. The
administrative hearing is, in practice, the only place of redress for

388 (2007) (holding that the agency's "shared living" regulation, which reduced
Medicaid recipients' in home care hours because they lived with their care givers,
violated the federal Medicaid Statute, so that agency exceeded its statutory
authority when promulgating the regulation); Schott v. Olszewski, 401 F.3d 682,
688-89 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding state agency violated federal law when Medicaid
did not reimburse recipient for medical expenses she paid out of pocket after she
was wrongfully denied coverage); White v. Beal, 555 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (3d Cir.
1977) (finding state statute was illegal when it covered eyeglasses for those
suffering from eye diseases but did not cover glasses for patients when refractive
error caused poor eyesight).
123See, e.g., Singh v. Reno, 182 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
administrative agencies lack the authority to deal with constitutional claims; the
final say on constitutional matters rests with the courts); Hodel v. Aguirre, 260 F.
Supp. 2d 695 (N.D. 1112.0 03) (holding that administrative agency hearings lack the
authority to deal dispositively with constitutional challenges); Modem, Inc. v.
Florida Dep't of Transp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that
under Florida law, where a litigant asserts that the agency applied a rule or statute
in an unconstitutional manner, the litigant must raise its claims on review in the
district court of appeal); Harrington v. Spokane County, 114 P.3d 1233, 1235
(Wash. App. Div. 2005) (holding that administrative agencies may not pass on the
facial constitutionality of the statutes they administer). See generally Stuart Greer,
Expanding the JudicialPower of the Administrative Law Judge to Establish
Efficiency and Fairnessin Administrative Adjudication,27 U. RICH. L. REv. 103,
104 n.5, 7 & 105 n.8 (1992).
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these clients. 2 4 Even if the unrepresented client can identify a nonadministrative legal issue and navigate the hearing process, which
assumes a great deal, she will never get the chance to present it.
Therefore, the AL's inability to overturn an illegal rule or to use
higher authority in making a legal determination prevents public
assistance appellants from getting a fair day in court.
The culture that permeates administrative agencies and influences
their employees - including, most significantly, ALJs - further

disadvantages welfare clients. ALJs have numerous incentives to
affirm the state's position denying eligibility.12 5 They are not truly
independent in the way that judicial branch judges are in making
their decisions for state and federal agencies.1 2 6
Perhaps the most palpable indication of agency power over the
ALJ decision-making process is the employment relationship of the
ALJ to the agency. In the federal system 27 and in almost half of all

124See

infra Part I.C.

125 See generally Lens,

FairHearingRoom, supra note 28, at 322 ("[Welfare]
clients were often suspicious of the state hearing officer, viewing him or her as an
adversary or not neutral. What they observed in the hearing room further enforced
the view ... [Appellants] picked up on the easy familiarity between the hearing
officer and agency representative when [they] walked into the hearing room ....
According to Professor Daye's empirical analysis of ALJ decisions and
judicial review in North Carolina prior to the 2000 amendments to its
Administrative Procedures Act, individuals did not generally succeed in
administrative adjudications. Charles E. Daye, Powers ofAdministrative Law
Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical andEmpiricalAssessment, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1571, 1629 (2001). This conclusion is based upon the fact that 76% of the
3,470 administrative hearings conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings
in North Carolina from 1985 through 1999 favored the agencies involved. Id. at
1615. Thus, when the public participates in the administrative adjudication process
it only succeeds against agencies 24% of the time. Id. But see Paul R. Verkuil,
Reflections upon the FederalAdministrativeJudiciary,39 UCLA L. REV. 1341,
1353 (1992) (arguing that federal ALJ in the Social Security Administration "acts
independently in all significant respects during the course of the decision process,
but once her decisions are made, they are not granted the respect of finality or even
deference.").
127 SSI appeals are heard by administrative judges employed by the Social
Security Administration. Proposals have been made to separate the administrative
decision makers from the SSA. See, e.g., Robin J. Arzt, Recommendationsfor a
New Independent AdjudicationAgency to Make the FinalAdministrative
126
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state hearing systems,128 the ALJ is directly employed by the very
agency whose decision is being challenged by the low-income
appellant. For example, Social Security Administration judges
constitute the vast majority of all federal ALJs.12 9 Their direct
employer is the same agency that has determined that the appellant
either is not eligible for or has been overpaid Social Security
disability or retirement benefits, or that the termination of these
critical benefits was appropriate. Yet the "independent"l 30 decision
maker who is hearing the appellant's case is paid by that agency, is
housed in the agency, works directly with the agency's management
and expert staff, and is supervised by agency employees.'

Adjudicationsof Social Security Act Benefit Claims, 23 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 267, 269 (2003).

See supra note 63. See also April Rolen-Ogden, When Administrative Law
JudgesRule the World: Wooley v. State Farm-Doesa Denial ofAgency-Initiated
JudicialReview ofAL] FinalOrders Violate the ConstitutionalDoctrineof
SeparationofPowers?, 66 LA. L. REv. 885, 890 (2006).
129 The Social Security Administration employs the highest number of ALJs of
any agency in the country. AdministrativeLaw Judges at the Social Security
Administration:Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H. Comm. On Ways
& Means, I10th Cong. (May 1, 2007) (statement of Linda M. Springer, Director,
U.S. Office of Personnel Management) (testifying that "The most recent data
available to [U.S. Office of Personnel Management] show there are over 1,400
ALJs serving in the Federal Government, 1,100 of whom work at [the Social
Security Administration] with the remainder primarily at the Department of Health
and Human Services, the Department of Labor, and the National Labor Relations
Board."). In fiscal year 2005, these ALJs presided over 500,000 disability hearings.
Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 16,424 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416, and
422).
130 See James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary'sIndependence
Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L.REv. 1191, 1192 (2006) ("Administrative judges have
an important role to fill: they are meant to preside impartially over fair hearings
that implement and administer agency policy. To perform this critical role in the
most effective way, administrative judges are not to function in a judicially
independent way. Instead, they must recognize that their role demands adherence to
agency policy and goals.").
131 See Jonathan R. Macey, SeparatedPowers and Positive PoliticalTheory:
The Tug of War Over AdministrativeAgencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 673 (1992).
Macey writes:
Congress's ability to design and structure an agency will "hardwire"
128

the agency to generate decisions that reflect the original understanding of

the enacting coalition. Congress can set the jurisdictional parameters of an
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Commenting upon the need for a central panel agency on the federal
level, United States District Court Judge John L. Kane, Jr. said, "I
think that having the agency or department that litigates before an
administrative law judge exercise the power to appoint, promote or
assign is the same as having the fox guard the hen house. Even the
most benign fox can be expected to make supper every now and
then."' 32
Even in central panel states, the administrative hearing office is
still a state agency and is often funded by the very agencies whose
decisions they are overseeing. For example, in several central panel
states, the Office of Administrative Hearings is a "revolving fund"1 33
agency that gets its funding for hearings directly from the welfare

agency, thereby determining which interest groups will have access to the
agency, and on what terms. In addition, Congress can affect the relative

abilities of various interests to influence future legislative actions and
control ex ante the outcomes generated by an administrative agency by
controlling which industries and interests will be reflected in the agency's
staffing decisions, by determining how "independent" the agency will be
from Congress, and by strengthening certain interest groups relative to
others.
Id. In the 1980s, Social Security ALJs who found too often in favor of people
appealing the agency's denial of disability benefits were disciplined by the Social
Security Administration for being too "pro-appellant." Ass'n of Admin. Law
Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C., 1984). The Association of
Administrative Law Judges sued the agency for this practice and lost. Id. at 1143.
132 John L. Kane, Jr., Public PerceptionsofJustice: JudicialIndependence and
Accountability, 17 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 203, 207 (1997).
133 See, e.g., TEXAS STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, AGENCY
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FISCAL YEARS 2007-2011 PERIOD 12-13 (2006),
availableat
http://www.soah.state.tx.us/AboutUs/StrtPlan/2007

2011/1 StrategicPlanComp

Doc.pdf (funding gathered through revenue appropriations from agencies, state
highway funds, one lump sum contract and hourly billing contracts with agencies);
MN Office of Administrative Hearings, Administrative Hearings Agency Profile I2 (2006), availableat http://www.budget.

state.mn.us/budget/profiles/administrativehearings-profile.pdf ("The
Administrative Law Division ... is funded by a special revenue revolving fund.");
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.12.130 (2003) ("The administrative hearings revolving
fund is hereby created in the state treasury for the purpose of centralized funding,
accounting, and distribution of the actual costs of the services provided to agencies
of the state government by the office of administrative hearings.").
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and other agencies for which they hold independent hearings.' 34
Agency funding governs everything from the number of judges
hearing cases to the amount of support staff to the type of computers,
fax machines and furniture in its office.' 35 ALJs are well aware of
this funding relationship, and so it provides an additional inducement
to err on the side of the agency, particularly when the appellant's
legal position is not a clear-cut winner. 136
In most central panel states, welfare agencies have the right to
review the decisions made by the independent Office of
Administrative Hearings ALJ. 3 7 Even though the central panel
agency hears the case and takes the evidence, it issues only an "initial
decision." That decision is then appealable back to the welfare
agency by either party.' 3 8 So even when appellants prevail before the

E.g., State of Washington Office of Admin. Hearings, Strategic Plan Fiscal
Years 2007-2013 11 (2006), availableat http://www.oah.wa.gov/200713StratPlan.pdf. See generally State of Minnesota, Admin. Hearings Agency
Overview 2006-07 Biennial Budget 3 (2005) availableat
http://www.budget.state.mn.us/budget/operating/200607/govrec/administrativehearings.pdf (describing governor's recommendation for an
hourly rate change for the services of administrative law judges and staff
attorneys).
" See State of Washington Office of Admin. Hearings, supra note 134, at 11
("Since OAH currently relies on receiving revenue from other state agencies that it
rules for or against, public confidence in the agency's ability to rule impartially
may be enhanced if it received direct appropriations of funding.").
"I As Chief ALJ for the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings
from 1996 to 1997, I saw directly the impact of agency funding on ALJ
independence described here. The statistics on the win-lose percentages of public
assistance appellants indicate that these incentives are real. See supra note 126.
17 Three of the twenty-six states with central panels have adopted some form
of final agency decision making with the ALJ, without a higher level of agency
review: Louisiana, South Carolina, and Washington State. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
49:992(B)(2) (2002) (stating that agency does not have power to override final ALJ
decision); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-610(A), (B) (2005) (providing for limited
agency review only for agencies with boards or commissions, but not agencies with
a single director); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-02-0215(5) (2005) (making ALJ
decisions final in certain public assistance cases).
131 See, e.g., 26 N.C. ADMIN. CODE § 03 .0127(c)(9) (2006) (explaining how
the welfare agency or benefits appellants can make an appeal back to the welfare
agency after the AU decision); I TEXAS ADMIN. CODE § 357.497 (2007) (stating
that ALJ's make "proposal for decision" appealable back to the welfare agency);
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-02-0215 (2005) (setting out when the AU makes the
134
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independent AU, the state can and frequently does appeal that
decision back to itself for review. The agency can then easily
overturn both the factual findings and the legal conclusions of the
independent judge that first heard the case. 13 9 The agency review
judge reviews de novo the legal conclusions of the ALJl 40 and gives
little if any deference to the ALYs factual findings.14 1 As a result,
even when the public assistance appellant prevails at the independent
administrative hearing, the agency power to appeal that decision back
to itself can make that win just a fleeting victory.142
final agency decision and when there is instead a further appeal to the agency
review judge).
'" See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e) (2000) (setting out the
standards of review used by agency review judges); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-020600 (2005) (same). But cf N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-34 (2000),
(strengthening the AU decision by directing the final agency decision makers to
adopt the decision unless it was "clearly contrary to the preponderance of the . . .
evidence."). Some statutory changes increasing the decisional power of the
independent AU have been made in response to the fact that the agency decision
makers charged with reviewing the ALI recommended decision "tended to reject
unfavorable recommendations and reinstate the agency's position in the case."
Julian Mann, III, Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a Recommendation, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1640 (2001).
140 See e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-02-0600(2)(c) (2005) (reviewing
judge may change hearing decision if it contains errors of law).
141 Three states give some deference to an ALJ's factual findings and
credibility determinations. In North Carolina, the agency must accept the AL's
findings of fact unless clearly contrary to the preponderance of evidence. N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-36(b) (2000). In Oregon, the agency may change AL's
findings of fact only if not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. OR. REV.
STAT. § 183.650(3) (2005). Finally, in Washington State, agency reviewers must
give only very minimal deference to an ALJ's factual finding: merely "due regard
to the presiding officer's opportunity to observe the witnesses." WASH. REV. CODE
34.05.464 (4) (2003). Client advocates were able to convince the welfare agency to
adopt in regulation a higher standard of deference to an ALJ's factual findings in
public assistance hearings. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-02-0600(2)(b) (2005)
("A review judge may only change the hearing decision if... the findings of fact
are not supported by substantial evidence based on the entire record.").
142 For both Medicaid and TANF decisions, the largest areas of administrative
appeals, federal law may discourage state welfare agencies from giving final
decision making authority to an independent hearing office. See generally 42
C.F.R. § 431.10(e)(3) (2007) ("[T]hey must not have the authority to change or
disapprove any administrative decision of that agency, or otherwise substitute their
judgment for that of the Medicaid agency. . . . "); 45 C.F.R. 205.100(3) (2007)
("[They] must not have authority to review, change, or disapprove any
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It is impossible to overstate the psychological and practical
advantages this review process bestows on the agency. Appellants
find it wholly unjust and unfair that an agency can itself review the
decision when it loses at an "independent" hearing.14 3 Claimants in
this situation may forego even attempting to respond to an appeal by
the agency if they feel there is little likelihood of a fair result.
Finally, some public assistance appellants are disadvantaged
when they confront ALJs who hold a general bias against them
because of their class, race, gender, disability or addiction.'" As case
law and scholarship have shown, some ALJs are prejudiced against
welfare claimants and, because of that prejudice, routinely make
discretionary credibility findings against them.'4 5 Such bias affecting
the outcome of a case can be difficult for an unrepresented claimant
to detect, let alone prove on review.146 When an ALJ considers
administrative decision of the single State agency, or otherwise substitute their
judgment for that of the agency ...... "). See also Grier v. Goetz, 402 F. Supp. 2d
876, 930 (M.D. Tenn. 2005) (holding that the state of Tennessee violated federal
rule when it entered into an agreement with Legal Services to give final decision
making authority for Medicaid cases to Tennessee's central panel agency).
143 Dissatisfaction of appellants with this appeal process has been cited as one
of the bases for limiting agency review of ALI decisions in North Carolina and
Oregon. David W. Heynderickx, FindingMiddle Ground: Oregon Experiments
with a CentralHearingPanelfor ContestedCase Proceedings,36 WILLAMETTE L.
REv. 219, 242 (2000) (agency review limited in Oregon); Mann, supra note 139, at
1645-46 (agency review limited in North Carolina). But see James F. Flanagan, An
Update on Developments in CentralPanels and ALJFinalOrderAuthority, 38
IND. L. REV. 401, 432 (2005) (arguing that ALJ finality has significant
disadvantages in terms of loss of political accountability for administrative decision
making and reduced agency capacity to develop and implement a consistent
regulatory scheme).
1" See generally Jason D. Vendel, GeneralBias andAdministrative Law
Judges: Is There a Remedy for Social Security Disability Claimants?,90 CORNELL
L. REv. 769 (2005) (discussing bias by administrative law judges and possible
remedies); Elaine Golin, Solving the Problem of Gender andRacial Bias in
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1532 (1995) (asserting that bias
exists in administrative adjudication).
145See, e.g., Grant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 462, 463-64 (M.D. Pa. 1989),
rev'dsub nom., Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1993), remandedsub nom.
to Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d 556 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (plaintiff groups brought
bias claims against ALI, alleging that ALJ discriminated against disability
claimants); Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (same).
46
1 See Small v. Sullivan, 820 F. Supp. 1098, 1105-06 (S.D. Ill. 1992) (citing
Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 94, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)) (granting waiver of
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herself a protector of the treasuryl 47 rather than a fair adjudicator of
the law and facts, the result is that the claimant must essentially
prove every element of her case beyond a reasonable doubt in order

to prevail.148
For these as well as other reasons, 149 the public assistance
appellant faces an extraordinarily daunting battle to prevail in the
administrative hearing process. Although the burden of proof in these
hearings is the "preponderance of the evidence" standard,15 0 the
burden in practice may be much higher, even at times requiring proof
of eligibility beyond a reasonable doubt in order to win at hearing
and avoid reversal. We must examine this process, which gives the
exhaustion requirement given the unreasonableness of expecting an unrepresented
claimant to perceive and challenge AL's predisposition to bias against social
security claimants); Grant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 462, 463-64 (M.D. Pa. 1989)
(noting that previous claimants had raised similar bias claims against the ALJ but
that the merit of those claims had not been addressed). See also Pronti, 339 F.
Supp. 2d at 495 ("[The evidence of bias] was not available to plaintiff Pronti at the
time of her. . . hearing before ALJ Russell ... .).
147 See, e.g., Jason D. Vendel, General Bias andAdministrativeLaw Judges: Is
There a Remedy for Social Security Disability Claimants?, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
769, 782 n.76 (quoting a judge describing himself as the "guardian of the Social
Security Trust Fund").
148See id. at 783-84 (relating a plaintiffs allegations that an ALJ effectuates
his bias against Social Security claimants by holding them to a higher standard of
proof than that required by law).
149 For example, the rules of evidence are relaxed in administrative hearings.
Under the Federal APA, all "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence" is
admissible. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000). Hearsay is admissible if it is relevant and
material and can alone support a factual finding if it is reliable and credible. 2 AM.
JUR. 2D AdministrativeLaw § 347 (2004). See also WASH. REV. CODE §
34.05.452 (2003) (stating that hearsay evidence is admissible if the presiding
officer believes "it is the kind of evidence on which reasonably prudent persons are
accustomed to rely in the conduct of their affairs"); MODEL STATE ADMIN.
PROCEDURE ACT § 4-212(a) (1981) (stating that "evidence may not be excluded
solely because it is hearsay"); William H. Kuehnle, Standards ofEvidence in
Administrative Proceedings,49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 829 (2005) (providing an indepth discussion of the relaxed standards of evidence in administrative
proceedings). The relaxed
evidentiary rules and admissibility of hearsay in public assistance hearings
allow the state to admit all types of potentially damaging evidence against
appellants that would never get in if the hearing were in the judicial branch.
Iso In public assistance hearings, appellants generally carry the burden by a
preponderance of the evidence. See infra Part II.
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state so much power and the appellant so little, to see if there are
ways to make the procedure more fair and just. Otherwise, the very
integrity of this justice system is at risk. Accordingly, I propose to
balance out the power inequities by taking a radically different
approach to the burden of proof in the administrative hearing setting.
So far, I have demonstrated the high stakes in these hearings and
the significant obstacles to a just result for low-income appellants. In
Part II I lay out the current confused state of the law of burdens in
public assistance hearings to set the stage for my proposal to clarify
and simplify the burdens. Afterward, I propose a reassignment of the
burdens of production and persuasion to the government in all needsbased assistance cases as the best solution to this inequitable hearing
system. 15 1

II. THE BURDENS

IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE HEARINGS ARE
INCONSISTENTLY AND UNFAIRLY APPLIED

There is widespread confusion over the precise meanings of the
different burdens and standards of proof applied in civil and criminal
cases as well as in the administrative forum. As Justice O'Conner
recently noted, the term "burden of proof' is one of the "slipperiest
member[s] of the family of legal terms." Part of the confusion
surrounding the term arises from the fact that historically, the concept
encompassed two distinct burdens: the "burden of persuasion," i.e.,
which party loses if the evidence is closely balanced, and the "burden
of production," i.e., which party bears the obligation to come forward
with the evidence at different points in the proceeding.1 5 2
Legal commentators have long been critical of the incoherent
treatment of burdens by the courts.' 53 This Part will demonstrate that
. See infra Part III.
152 Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (citing 2 JOHN W. STRONG,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (5th ed. 1999)).
I See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions,Inferences and Burden of Proofin
FederalCivil Actions-An Anatomy of UnnecessaryAmbiguity anda Proposalfor
Reform, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 892 (1982); Francis H. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable
PresumptionsofLaw Upon the Burden ofProof 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (1920);
Neil S. Hecht & William M. Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions:Order Out of Chaos,
58 B.U. L. REV. 527 (1978); John E. Stumbo, Presumptions-A View at Chaos, 3
WASHBURN L.J. 182 (1964).
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the burdens in these administrative appeals are perhaps even more
confused than in civil cases generally and that this confusion harms
those in our country who are most at risk and least able to understand
or meet these burdens.
Since public assistance hearings are the only realistic forum in
which to contest denials of critical benefits, it is imperative that the
inequities in the system be eliminated. In this Part, I first illustrate the
generally confused state of burden setting in these hearings. Then,
where possible, I attempt to clarify the assignment of burdens by
describing their application both when a state or the federal APA
alone governs the hearing process and when they do not singularly
govern. Finally, I show that where there is clarity, the burden of
proof is almost always placed on the public assistance appellant
rather than on the government.
A. "CooperativeFederalism"and Confusion over Burdens of
Proof
In public assistance hearings, the burdens of production and
persuasion either clearly favor the government, or are difficult to
ascertain. This confusion is caused in great part by the complexity of
the laws and regulations governing the administration of the various
welfare programs. With the notable exception of the SSI program,
which is both federally funded and administered under one national
standard,' 5 4 all the major needs-based public assistance programs are
authorized by federal statute and administered by the individual
states. This has been described by the courts as "cooperative
federalism," whereby the federal government prescribes the broad
perimeters of a program but leaves decisions about how to run it to
the discretion of the states.' The Medicaid, TANF, and Food Stamp
programs were each created by federal statute and are largely

154

42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (2000).

' 5 See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S.

473, 495 (2002) (when interpreting statutes "designed to advance cooperative
federalism[,] ... we have not been reluctant to leave a range of permissible choices
to the States").
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federally funded,"' but they are differently administered in each of
the fifty states.
None of these federal public assistance statutes assigns the
burden of proof in hearings governing these programs. As a result,
any one of a variety of sources of law might dictate the burden of
proof - if it is explicitly assigned at all. If the state chooses to apply
its own administrative procedure act ("APA") to its welfare hearings,
then the burden of proof will be found there.' 5 7 Or the state may pass
statutes or regulations specific to the state agency that governs the
program or its hearings.' 58 If neither of these sources provides clear
authority, there may be cases in which ALJs or courts have tried to
discern the burden.1 59 It is no wonder, then, that the question of who
bears the burden of proof in welfare cases often proves so difficult
for judges and lawyers, let alone pro se appellants, to answer.
In hearings governed by a state or the federal APA, there is some
clarity about who bears the burden of proof, and I will next discuss
the current state of the law in these instances. Then I will explore the
confusion that emerges when an APA does not clearly apply or is
overridden by another statute or regulation, or when the courts are
left to sort out the issue.

"6 The Food Stamp Program is entirely federally funded. 7 U.S.C. §§ 20112036 (2000). The Medicaid and TANF programs are funded approximately 50% by
the federal government and 50% by the states. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000); 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000).
"' See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-102(3) (2007) (applying Colorado's
Administrative Procedures Act to virtually all state agencies, including the public
assistance agencies and the Office of Administrative Courts); COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-4-105(7) (2007) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of an
order shall have the burden of proof); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(1) (2003)
(except to extent provided otherwise by another statute, the burden of
demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting invalidity).
"' See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256.045 (2007) (governing administrative
hearing procedures on human services cases); Ohison v. Weil, 953 P.2d 939 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1997) (holding that state Medicaid agency bears the burden by a
preponderance of the evidence to establish the basis of the ruling being appealed,
pursuant to its own regulation, Department of Social Services Regulation No.
8.058.54, 10 CODE COLO. REGS. 2505-10); WASH. REV. CODE § 74.08.080(2)(g)
(2003) (assigning the burden of proof in Medicaid transfer of assets cases to the
welfare agency by preponderance of the evidence).
59
' See cases cited infra in Part II.C infra for examples of case law setting the
burden.
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B. The Burden ofProofin APA-Governed Hearings
If a state or federal administrative procedure act applies to
particular welfare hearings, that statute generally sets out who has the
burden of proof, though it can be superseded by a more specific
statute or regulation. The APAs on both the federal1 60 and state' 6 '
levels require that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the
proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof." 62 The
proponent of a rule or order is the person who brings forward a
matter for litigation or action, the moving party, or the party asserting
the affirmative of a fact or issue. 163 Therefore, the proponent is
virtually always the person challenging the agency action in the
administrative hearing process, not the government agency.1 6 This is
true in all APA-governed agency hearings, whether the appellant is a
business represented by a large law firm challenging the
Environmental Protection Agency's promulgation of air quality rules
or a pro se person with a mental disability appealing the Social
Security Administration's denial of disability benefits. The APAs
make no distinctions in burden allocation based on the likely
sophistication of the appellant, the amount of power and resources
160
161

5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE

§§ 34.05.001-34.05.903 (2003); CAL. Gov'T

CODE §§ 11370-11370.5 (West 2007); OR. REv. STAT. § 183.310 (2005); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-4-105(7) (2007).
162 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). See also, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.570(l)(a)

(2003) (stating that unless provided otherwise elsewhere in the code, the "burden of
demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting invalidity").
163 See, e.g., Velasquez v. Dep't of Higher Educ., 93 P.3d 540, 542 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2003); N. Cent. Good Samaritan Ctr. v. N.D. Dep't of Human Servs., 611
N.W.2d 141, 145 (N.D. 2000); Plummer v. District of Columbia Bd. of Funeral
Dirs., 730 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C. 1999); Espinoza v. Dep't of Bus. and Profl
Regulation, 739 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), dismissed 761 So. 2d
328 (Fla. 2000); 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 354 (2004).
1" See, e.g., Dir., Office of Workers' Comp., Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1994); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v.
U.S. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1989). But see Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. Loxicy, 934 F.2d 511, 523 (4th Cir. 1991)
(maintaining that the burden of proof properly belonged to physician who sought
an order compelling full payment, even where the employer requested the hearing).
See also 2 AM. JUR. 2ND AdministrativeLaw § 355 (2004).
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she has relative to the agency, or the nature of the benefit being
denied. In the welfare context, a public assistance appellant must
prove that the state's action was invalid in both a termination, in
which the agency has previously found the appellant to meet its
eligibility requirements, and an initial denial of benefits.
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the federal APA
provision that places the burden on the proponent of a rule or order in
Greenwich Collieries,165which involved a review of a Department of
Labor ("DOL") grant of Black Lung benefits to a miner.'6 6 The DOL
had promulgated the "true doubt rule," which shifted the burden of
persuasion to the party opposed to the benefits claim (typically the
mining company).' 6 7 Under the "true doubt rule," Black Lung
Benefits Act ("BLBA") claimants who challenged a denial of this
health benefit in an administrative hearing would win the claim when
the evidence was evenly balanced.168 A majority of the Supreme
Court, however, found that this rule violated the burden of proof
requirement in federal APA section 7(c), which places the burden of
proof on the proponent of a rule or order - in this case, the benefits
claimant.16 9 It held that as used in the Act, the phrase "burden of
proof' meant the burden of persuasion, not just, as the DOL had
argued, the burden of production (i.e., the burden of going forward
with evidence).1 70 The DOL accordingly did not have the latitude to
reassign the burden of persuasion to the opposing party. The
Supreme Court reasoned that the federal APA is "a statute designed
to introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of
Greenwich Collieries,512 U.S. at 269-76.
Id. at 269-70.
167 Id. at 269. The "true doubt rule" took a step towards the position I advocate
in this Article.
16

166

'68 Id.

169 Id. at 269.

Id. at 272-82. Prior to the Court's decision, the burden of proof requirement
under the APA had been interpreted to mean only the burden of coming forward
with evidence to support a claim, not the burden of persuasion. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 n.7 (1983) (noting that Sec. 7(c) of the
APA "determines only the burden of going forward, not the burden of persuasion");
Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J.,
supplemental opinion) ("the 'burden of proof [Section 7(c)] casts upon the
'proponent' is the burden of coming forward with proof, and not the ultimate burden
of persuasion").
170
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administrative practice among diverse agencies whose customs had
departed widely from each other" and that this uniformity is
compromised if agencies are free to create presumptions.17 1 "Under §
7(c) . .. when the evidence is evenly balanced, the benefits claimant

must lose."l 72
The Greenwich Collieries Court thus held, for the first time, that
for agency hearings governed by the federal APA, agencies can bear
the burdens of production and persuasion only if Congress amends
programs' enabling statutes specifically to place them on the
agencies.1 73 Agencies administering a federal program whose
governing statute explicitly incorporates the federal APA and its
burden of proof provision can no longer shift the burden by
promulgating regulations. Absent a statute firmly placing the burden
on the government, public benefits recipients and applicants in
federal APA-governed hearings must therefore prove their eligibility
in every instance, despite Congress' intentions that the program be
remedial and that the agency should resolve doubts about eligibility
in favor of the benefits recipient.174
It would be possible for an administrative agency to reallocate the
burden of proof in its hearings through its rulemaking authority if the
statute authorizing the benefits program were silent as to who held
the burden.' 7 5 This avenue is open only when a benefits program's
enabling statute either does not incorporate the APA's default
provision concerning the burden of proof or when the statute
expressly reserves to the administering agency the power to modify
the APA's provisions via regulation. A regulatory allocation of the

17'
72

1

Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 280-81.
Id. at 281.

'" Id. at 280-8 1.
174See

id. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting) (pointing out that Congress intended
the Black Lung Benefits Act to be remedial in nature and doubts about eligibility to
be resolved in favor of the coal miner).
17' Bunce v. Sec'y of State, 607 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) ("an
agency can reallocate the burden of proof, either by rule or agency procedure, when
necessary and consistent with the legislative scheme"). Cf Schaffer v. Weast, 546
U.S. 49 (2005) (leaving open the question of whether states, through statutes or
regulations, may override the default rule that the burden falls on the party seeking
relief).
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burden of proof to the government would still have to be consistent
with the legislative intent behind the program.1 76
Individual state legislatures must decide whether their state APA
default burden rule applies to joint federal-state public benefits
programs administered by state welfare agencies - benefits such as
Food Stamps, TANF, and Medicaid.' 7 7 In Washington State, for
example, the legislature has chosen to apply its state APA to
administrative hearings involving public assistance benefits, 7 7 but
several other states have declined to take this approach.' 7 9 Further,
even if the state's default APA rule applies, it might still be possible
for a state welfare agency to override that provision through
regulation, since the Greenwich Collieriesdecision only applies to
federal agency rules.'o Even after Greenwich Collieries, then,
several avenues for burden reallocation in state agency hearings
remain open.
C. The Burden ofProofin Non-APA-Governed PublicAssistance
Hearings
While there is relative clarity that welfare appellants carry the
burden when their benefit program is covered by a federal or state
APA default rule, that clarity dissipates when the default rule does
not apply. In some cases, the statute that establishes a benefit
program explicitly allocates burdens. I will examine one such
instance: for those programs that require a disability test, the Social
"6 See Greenwich Collieries,512 U.S. at 271 ("[A]ssuming, arguendo,that the
Department has the authority to displace § 7(c) through regulation-this ambiguous
regulation does not overcome the presumption that these adjudications under the
BLBA are subject to § 7(c)'s burden of proof provision.").
'n Significantly, the definition of "Agency" in the federal APA expressly
refers to authorities of the government of the United States but not the individual
states. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1) (2000). Therefore, state agency hearings on eligibility for
benefits from joint federal-state programs are not governed by the federal APA or
the ruling in Greenwich Collieries,which is an interpretation of that statute. See
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 281 ("the true doubt rule violates § 7(c) of the
APA").
178

WASH. REV. CODE

§ 74.08.080(2) (2001).

"7 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.330 (2006) (Administrative Procedures

Act does not apply to public benefits hearings).
180 See supra note 177.

Fall 2010

Public Assistance Administrative Hearings

651

Security Act distributes the burdens of proof on the issue of whether
or not a person is "disabled" enough to need assistance. Even when
an enabling statute provides such guidance, however, areas of
ambiguity can emerge, as has happened in the case of disproving
disability when the agency seeks to terminate benefits. I will examine
case law that addresses who carries the burden in an appeal of
benefits termination for a person who is already enrolled in social
security disability. In other types of welfare cases, where statutes and
regulations provide little or no guidance, the case law's assignment of
burdens is ambiguous and haphazard. I will show that in appeals
involving financial eligibility for benefits, the cases that have
addressed who carries the burden and at what level are all over the
map.
1.Burdens of Proof in Agency Determinations of Disability
One prominent area where a statute provides specific guidance
about the burden of proof is the determination of disability for
purposes of initially qualifying for SSI or Medicaid benefits. As SSI
and Medicaid are two of the largest benefits programs, the question
of who carries the burden in these hearing processes has considerable
implications. Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act") provides
for payment of disability benefits to indigent persons under the SSI
program.' 8 ' Under the Act, "disability" is defined as the "inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months." 82 The Act provides
that an individual
shall be determined to be under a disability only if
his physical or mental impairment or impairments
are of such severity that he is not only unable to do
his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists

18' 42
182 Id.

U.S.C. § 1382 (2000).
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).
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in the national economy, regardless of whether
such work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for

work.183
Once disability is established and the claimant also shows he or
she is within the resource and income limitations of SSI,184 the
claimant receives benefits in the form of monthly income and health
insurance. 8 5 If the Social Security Administration determines that
the claimant does not qualify as "disabled" and, therefore, denies the
benefits claim, the claimant can appeal.1 86
Proof of disability is difficult to establish and follows a sequential
five step process.' Under this process, the applicant bears the
burden of proving each of the first four points: (1) that she is out of
work, (2) the severity of her impairments,' (3) that the disability
will last for a year or more,' 8 9 and (4) that the impairment prevents
her from doing any work she has done in the past.' 90 Only after the
Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
In 2007, the SSI limits are $2,000 or less in savings and $623 per month in
income for a single person. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205 (2007) (resources);
Understanding Supplemental Security Income,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/text-income-ussi.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008)
(income).
1542 U.S.C. § 1381a (2000).
186 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1413-1479 (2007) (describing procedures).
187 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (2007).
188 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c) (2007). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) (2007)
("In
that
you
This
means
or
disabled.
are
blind
to
us
that
you
to
prove
general, you have
must furnish medical and other evidence that we can use to reach conclusions about
your medical impairments.").
189 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (2007).
190 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b) (2007). See also Gray v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 369, 371
(1st Cir. 1985) ("It is well settled that a claimant seeking disability benefits has the
initial burden of proving that her impairments prevent her from performing her
former type of work."); Gonzalez Perez v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572
F.2d 886, 888 (1st Cir. 1978) (declining to remand even though there were no
findings or analysis by the AL that related the claimant's psychological disorder to
the capabilities necessary to perform her prior work on the ground that "a claimant
must establish that he can no longer perform his prior vocation before the
government is obligated to prove that alternative employment is available for a
183

184
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applicant has proven each of these elements does the burden then
shift to the government to show the fifth and last point, namely, that
the claimant could perform some work that is available in the
national economy.'91 Although the Supreme Court has said in dictum
that the burden shift in step five includes both the availability of work
in the national economy and the claimant's ability to perform the
work,192 federal circuit courts remain divided on the scope of the

shifted burden.19 3
person in claimant's condition. It is not sufficient to assert some general, functional
disability and then leave it to the government to present evidence as to the practical
consequences of the disability in terms of the requirements of the claimant's prior
work. That is the claimant's responsibility."); Pelletier v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 525 F.2d 158, 160 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that "[the plaintiff] did not
bear her burden of proving a disability").
1' 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(g) (2007) ("We [the SSA] must provide evidence
about the existence of work in the national economy that you can do."). See also
Lancellotta v. Sec'y of Health & Human Services, 806 F.2d 284, 284 (1st Cir.
1986) ("[T]he inquiry as to whether Lancellotta was disabled focused on whether
there existed, in significant numbers, other jobs in the regional or national economy
that he could nonetheless perform. The burden of showing the existence of other
jobs was on the Secretary.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);
Mimms v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 180,185 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The burden of proving
disability is on the claimant. However, once the claimant has established a prima
facie case by proving that his impairment prevents his return to his prior
employment, it then becomes incumbent upon the Secretary to show that there
exists alternative substantial gainful work in the national economy which the
claimant could perform, considering his physical capability, age, education,
experience and training.") (citations omitted); Vazquez v. Sec'y of Health &
Human Servs., 683 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982) ("It is well established that, in applying
this statutory standard, the claimant has the burden of showing a disability serious
enough to prevent him from working at his former jobs, at which point the burden
shifts to the Secretary to show the existence of other jobs in the national economy
that the claimant can nonetheless perform.").
192 Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987) ("It is true ... that the
Secretary bears the burden of proof at step five, which determines whether the
claimant is able to perform work available in the national economy.").
193 Compare Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Once [the
claimant] has shown that he is unable to perform his previous work and that his
disability has lasted or may be expected to last at least twelve months, the burden
shifts to the Secretary to show that there is other substantial gainful employment
available that the claimant is capable of performing .. .. If the Secretary
adequately points to potential alternative employment ... the burden then shifts
back to the claimant to prove that he is unable to perform the alternate work.")
(citation omitted) with Cole v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 768, 776
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Some courts have held that unrepresented SSI applicants must put
on all the evidence available on the issue of disability; otherwise they
lose the claim.' 94 Other courts have placed a higher duty on the
agency to develop the record at the hearing when an appellant
appears pro se.m' The latter courts have recognized the limited ability
of appellants to make the case for disability without the assistance of
counsel, and thus have placed a greater duty on the ALJ to make sure
that the record is complete and that the government has provided the
documentation necessary to adequately assess disability.
(6th Cir. 1987) ("Since there is no other evidence in the record that would support a
finding that plaintiff is capable of performing specific jobs in the economy, the
Secretary has failed to carry his burden of proof and benefits
should be awarded."), Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1987)
(remanding case with instructions to Secretary to award disability benefits), Frey v.
Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1987) ("The claimant bears the burden of
proving a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. However, once
a showing is made of disability preventing the claimant from engaging in prior
work activity, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show 'that the claimant retains
the capacity to perform an alternative work activity and that this specific type of
job exists in the national economy.' If the Secretary does not meet this burden, the
claimant is disabled for purposes of award of disability benefits.") (citation
omitted), andHalvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d
1221, 1225 (7th Cir. 1984) ("A claimant has the burden of proof to establish an
inability to return to her past relevant work, while, if the claimant meets that
burden, the Secretary then has the burden to prove that there is some other
substantial gainful employment available that the claimant can perform.").
194 See, e.g., Vazquez Vargas v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 838 F.2d 6,
9 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that ALJ failed in his duty to assist her
as a pro se claimant when he declined to obtain further medical records after
plaintiff had failed to provide him with information to help identify the relevant
records); Ramirez v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 528 F.2d 902, 903 (1st Cir.
1976) (per curiam) (holding that the lack of counsel will not furnish grounds for
disturbing denial of benefits when the right to counsel was voluntarily waived,
absent showing that claimant was in any way misled or that the hearing was in any
way unfair).
195 See, e.g., Evangelista v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136,
142 (1st Cir. 1987) ("We have long recognized that social security proceedings are
not strictly adversarial. Accordingly, we have made few bones about our insistence
that the Secretary bear a responsibility for adequate development of the record in
these cases. Understandably, this responsibility increases when the applicant is
bereft of counsel.") (citations omitted); Livingston v. Califano, 614 F.2d 342, 345
(3d Cir. 1980) ("the AL should assume a more active role when the claimant is
unrepresented and thus has a heightened duty of care and responsibility in such
instances") (citing Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1984)).
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At least one court has distinguished between Social Security (a
social insurance non-welfare program) and the needs-based SSI
program when it comes to allocating the burden of proving disability.
Although both Social Security and SSI have identical legal disability
standards, the Third Circuit has held that if the ALJ in an SSI hearing
believes that evidence of disability is inconclusive or unclear, it is the
judge's responsibility to secure whatever evidence is needed to make
a sound determination. The court stated, "The statutory language in
Title II [SS] which places the burden of proof as to the medical basis
of a finding of disability on the claimant at all times is simply not
present in Title XVI [SSI]."l96 In the welfare program setting, the
Third Circuit put the burden on the government to provide enough
evidence to make a clear determination of eligibility and did not let
the agency rest on its laurels when an unrepresented claimant is
unable to put on enough evidence to prove disability.
2.Burdens in Terminations of Benefits Cases
Once a client has been found eligible for public benefits, one
might think the burden of proof would shift to the government when
it later attempts to terminate those benefits. Only the Ninth Circuit
has followed that reasoning.' 97 In Pattiv. Schweiker, it held that once
the Secretary has determined that a claimant is disabled, there is a
presumption of continuing disability. 9 8 Therefore, benefits cannot be
terminated unless the government shows that the appellant's
condition has substantially improved. In Patti, the court found itself
"unable to discern any reason why the familiar principle that a
condition, once proved to exist, is presumed to continue to exist,
should not be applied when disability benefits are at stake."' 99
Other circuits, however, have come to the opposite conclusion,
requiring claimants to re-prove their disability at a termination
hearing even though the government has already found their
condition to be disabling. So holding, the Sixth Circuit wrote:

196 Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 36 n.4 (3d Cir. 1985).
1'
'9 8

Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1982).

Id.

' Id.
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The burden of establishing continuing disability is
on the appellant .... [T]he standards to be applied
by the Court in reviewing a termination of benefits
do not differ materially from those applied in
reviewing a denial of benefits.

. .

. In a case in

which benefits have been terminated, as in a case in
which benefits have been denied, the burden of
proving disability is on the claimant, not on the

Secretary. 200
Thus the allocation of the burden of proof in termination of
disability bases can be shifted by the federal court of appeals. The
unsettled state of the law in this area does suggest that some courts
are recognizing the policy considerations that weigh in favor of
placing the burden on the agency when substantial benefits are on the
line. It also hints at the ambiguity that persists outside of the
disability context, where federal courts of appeals have not yet
weighed in and might come down on either side of the issue.
So despite the myriad cases, statutes, and regulations discussing
the burden of proof on the sole issue of disability for SSI and
Medicaid eligibility cases, it can still be difficult to ascertain where
the burden lies in these appeals. The issue of who bears the burden of
proof can depend on the circuit in which the appellant resides or on
the particular ALJ hearing the case.
3.Burdens in Financial Eligibility Cases
In cases where an agency denies, reduces, or terminates TANF,
Medicaid, Food Stamps, or SSI benefits based on financial
ineligibility, family composition, lack of medical necessity, or failure
to participate in a job search, the courts generally place the burden of
disproving the agency's finding on the low-income appellant. But
even here there are inconsistent decisions. Case law in this area is
scarce; but some state courts have held that an applicant for or

200 Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (6th Cir. 1972). See also Gist
v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 736 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that
there is no presumption of ongoing disability solely based on a state agency's
previous finding of disability).
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current recipient of benefits must prove each and every element of
eligibility.
In an unpublished opinion involving continuing financial
eligibility for Food Stamps, for example, the Washington Court of
Appeals found that, even in a termination case, "[t]he party
challenging the agency's decision bears the burden of proving the
decision is invalid." 20 1 In Alabama, the state appeals court held that
their Medicaid agency's determination of ineligibility is given a
"presumption of correctness." 202 Applicants for benefits have
consistently been required by state courts both to come forward with
all financial evidence regarding their eligibility and to prove they are
within the eligibility requirements. 203 On the other hand, a few courts
Yurtis v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 110 Wash. App. 1060, (Wash. Ct.
App. 2002) (citing the Washington APA's default rule in placing the burden of
proof on the person challenging the agency decision). See also WASH. REV. CODE §
34.05.570 (2003).
202 Ala. Medicaid Agency v. Norred, 497 So.2d 176, 177 (Ala. Civ. App.
1986). This conclusion is warranted by the limited standard of review in the circuit
court under the Alabama APA. See ALA. CODE § 41-22-20(k) (1993) (providing
that, in the circuit court, "[t]he agency order shall be taken as prima facie just and
reasonable and the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as
to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, except where otherwise
authorized by statute").
203 See, e.g., Williams v. Scott, 647 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. 1983) (holding that
burden is on applicant for Medicaid benefits to prove eligibility to the satisfaction
of the administrative agency; there is no burden on the agency to investigate
applicant's claim and introduce rebutting proof); Fischer v. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab.
Serys., 21 P.3d 509, 515 (Kan. 2001) (holding that determination of which party
would bear burden of proof regarding classification of resources in connection with
determination of Medicaid eligibility was a question of law, and Supreme Court's
review was therefore unlimited); In re Welfare of Sayles, 407 N.W.2d 414 (Minn.
App. 1987) (holding that Department of Human Service's rule providing that trust
fund is subject to personal property limitations mandated under applicable state law
unless it can be affirmatively demonstrated that such fund could not be made
available to meet individual's medical needs placed burden of proof on recipient to
demonstrate affirmatively that fund in question could not be made available);
Jackson v. Dep't of Soc. Serys., 706 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
claimant who applied for medical assistance benefits had burden of proving her
resources did not exceed $2,000); Wagner v. Sheridan County Soc. Servs. Bd., 518
N.W.2d 724 (N.D. 1994) (finding that Medicaid applicant had burden of presenting
reliable information as to value of her assets for purposes of determining her
eligibility for Medicaid benefits); Ptashkin ex rel. Fliegelman v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 731 A.2d 238, 241 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (holding that applicant fully
201
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have found that the burden of proof shifts to the state to show
ineligibility once an appellant puts on a prima facie case showing he
or she meets the eligibility requirements of the program.2'04
In appeals of terminations from public assistance benefits that get
all the way through the administrative process up to the courts, some
state courts have held that, when terminating a recipient, the state
bears the burden of proving that a recipient is no longer financially
eligible.2 0 5 One state court in Colorado, for example, held that the
burden switches to the state to prove ineligibility by a preponderance
of the evidence once an applicant for benefits appeals to the judicial
bears burden of proving eligibility for medical assistance); Martin v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 514 A.2d 204, 209 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (finding that burden is on
medical assistance applicants to determine their eligibility, but that applicants must
be advised of all services and benefits).
2
1 See, e.g., Salinas v. Canyon County, 786 P.2d 611, 614 (Idaho. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that once applicant presents at least prima facie showing of medical
indigency, burden of proof shifts to board of county commissioners to rebut
applicant's claims.); Johnson v. Dep't of Human Servs., 565 N.W.2d 453, 458
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the general rule applicable to civil cases that
prima facie case shifts burden of going forward to opposing party applies to
administrative proceeding to determine eligibility for medical assistance funds for
health service).
205 Raitport v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 688 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999) (interpreting New York's social services law to deem those
properly receiving SSI as having met the eligibility criteria, so that the agency must
show other ways to terminate). For example, in Kegel v. State, the Human Services
Department sought to terminate a child's health care benefits on ground that the
child was the beneficiary of a "Medicaid qualifying trust." Kegel v. State, 830 P.2d
563, 564 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). The court held that the burden of proof was upon
the Department to show that the child was no longer eligible for benefits by
showing that the trust fund in question was a Medicaid qualifying trust and thus
"available" income. Id. at 565. In Dep't ofSocialServs. v. Beckner, the Department,
acting as claimant against the estate of a Medicaid recipient, sued to recover a sum
allegedly expended on the recipient's behalf. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Beckner, 813
S.W.2d 353, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). The court held that the Department had the
burden of proof and the estate was not required to adduce evidence to defeat the
claim. Id. at 355. Similarly, in Simmons v. Van Alstyne, the court held that the
burden of proof when discontinuing Medicaid benefits is not on petitioner, but on
the local agency in the first instance. Simmons v. Van Alstyne, 410 N.Y.S.2d 400,
403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). Finally, in Balino v. Department ofHealth and
RehabilitativeServices, the court held that the burden of proof at a reclassification
hearing was upon the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, not upon
recipients of Medicaid benefits seeking continued assistance. Balino v. Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Sen's., 348 So.2d 349, 349 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1977).
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system after losing in the administrative hearing process.20 6 At the
same time, other courts have held that a current recipient must prove
all elements of eligibility in court.20 7
Whether or not the correct allocation of the burden, to the extent
that it is even articulated by the courts, is communicated to and
correctly applied by the administrative hearing judge in a pro se
client's case is questionable at best. It is my experience that the
burden of proof is rarely discussed by ALJs in the administrative
hearing, even in the rare instance when the client is represented.
Given the varied and confusing decisions within the various state and
federal courts 208 and the general paucity of law on the issue, it is time
to provide a clearly articulated and consistent rule allocating the
burden of proof. Given the critical nature of public assistance
benefits to low-income families, the importance of the assignment of
burden of proof to the outcome of cases, and the policy
considerations that should inform burden setting, 209 the rule should
favor public assistance applicants and recipients.
III. A SOCIAL JUSTICE PROPOSAL TO STANDARDIZE THE BURDEN AND
PLACE IT ON THE STATE

A. A "Clearand Convincing Evidence" Standard
I propose that the crazy quilt of burdens in the public assistance
arena be abandoned in favor of a clearly articulated burden in every
Ohlson v. Weil, 953 P.2d 939, 941 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that on
Medicaid applicant's appeal from adverse ruling by state Department of Health
Care Policy and Financing, Department bears burden, by preponderance of
evidence, to establish basis of ruling being appealed).
207 Jones v. Bureau of Tenncare, 94 S.W.3d 495 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that State Medicaid plan, TennCare, did not have the burden of
establishing a change of circumstances before it could terminate coverage for home
health services; its only burden was to establish that the services were not
medically necessary).
208 Having a consistent burden of proof serves the function of reducing
confusion in the court system. Without it, "the triers of fact might assign their own
burden, substituting their own notion of equity and justice for those mandated by
law." Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and PopulistRhetoric: Shifting the Burden
ofProofin Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGs L.J. 239, 246 (1987).
2 See infra Part III.C (discussing the policies behind burden assignment).
206
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case.2 10 I would establish standardized burdens of production and
persuasion that consistently favors benefits applicants and recipients
in administrative hearings reviewing denials, terminations, and
findings of overpayment of all needs-based public benefits. I base
this proposal on the sound policy considerations that have, in other
contexts, moved courts, legislatures, and agencies to deviate from the
default rule of placing the burden on the moving party. This proposal
is a simple and fair way of addressing the significant confusion and
inequity in the administrative hearing system which can result in the
wrongful loss of critical income, food, and medical benefits for the
indigent.
I propose that when the government seeks to deny a public
benefit, it must provide evidence demonstrating every element of the
appellant's ineligibility for benefits. In other words, to prevail at
hearing, the state would have to come forward with facts that prove
that the claimant is not financially qualified for the benefit program,
not medically in need of the service applied for, or had been overpaid
benefits. Thus, an appellant could prevail at the hearing without
putting on a case if the agency failed to meet its burden of coming
forward with evidence to prove ineligibility.
I would first require that all public assistance applicants and
recipients fully cooperate with the agency in obtaining all
information necessary to establish eligibility or ineligibility for
benefits or to maintain current benefits. 2 11 Appellants, on the other
210

Commentators frequently complain about the haphazard development of the

law on burdens and presumptions. For example, Judge Learned Hand complained,
"Judges have mixed [the law of presumptions] up until nobody can tell what on
earth it means and the important thing is to get something which is workable and
which can be understood and I don't much care what it is." 18 A.L.I. PROC. 217-18
(1941), quoted in Neil S. Hecht & William M. Pinzler, RebuttingPresumptions:
Order out of Chaos, 58 B.U. L. REV. 527, 527 (1978). See also generally Joel S.
Hjelmaas, Stepping Backfrom the Thicket: A Proposalfor the Treatment of
Rebuttable Presumptionsand Inferences, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 427 (1993); G.
Michael Fenner, Presumptions:350 Years of Confusion and It Has Come to This,
25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 383 (1992). The confusion and inconsistency in the
definition and application of burdens is particularly harmful when applied to
hearings deciding eligibility for critical needs benefits.
2"1 Public assistance applicants and recipients are currently required to
cooperate fully in agency investigations of eligibility and continuing eligibility.
See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 416.200 (2007) (requiring applicants as well as recipients of
SSI to "give [the agency] any information we request and show [the agency]
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hand, would only be required to provide the agency with access to
this information, not to directly provide the evidence. Appellants
would have to sign all necessary releases of information so that the
agency can obtain medical and financial information from banks,
doctors, employers, and so on. They would also be required to inform
the agency of the location of their assets and income, the identities of
their relevant medical providers and employers, and the identities of
the people and agencies having information that can help establish
whether or not they meet eligibility criteria. The applicant's full
cooperation in providing the agency with access to necessary
information is essential, but once given, the burden of tracking down
and presenting this evidence would be on the agency, not on the low
income client.2 12
I would further require that the agency meet a different and
higher level of proof than is currently the standard in public
assistance hearings. The traditional requirement is a "preponderance
of the evidence" standard; 2 13 1 propose that the state be obligated to
prove ineligibility by the intermediate standard of "clear and
convincing evidence." 214 Under a clear and convincing evidence
necessary documents or other evidence to prove that you meet [eligibility]
requirements"); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912 (2007) (requiring applicants to prove
eligibility by providing necessary "evidence" for the agency to reach conclusion
regarding disability); 20 C.F.R § 416.916 (2007) (requiring applicants and
recipients to co-operate in furnishing evidence of disability; failure to co-operate
results in agency rendering decision based on information available); 20 C.F.R. §
416.918 (2007) (requiring applicants and recipients to participate in examination or
test to determine disability); WASH. REV. CODE § 74.04.300 (2001) (requiring
recipients of benefits to notify the department of changes that would result in
ineligibility for benefits).
212 If the public benefits appellant failed to cooperate in the agency's
information gathering by failing to sign releases, to identify witnesses or medical
providers, or to submit to examinations, then he or she would lose the benefit of the
shifted burden.
213 See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981) (holding that the
standard of proof in APA hearings is preponderance of the evidence); California ex
rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981)
(preponderance of the evidence is the standard employed in most civil cases); J.H.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2498 (4th ed. 1995).
214 There are generally three standards of proof: preponderance of the
evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt. The level
of proof relates to how much confidence the fact finder should have in the factual
findings. For an example of an argument for imposing a higher burden based on the
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requirement, the state would have the burden of proving all of the
critical elements of its case by substantially more than 51% of the
evidence. 2 15 As a result, only those who are clearly ineligible for
benefits would lose them.
This proposal for a clear and convincing evidence standard in the
administrative hearing setting is not unprecedented. While the
general standard of proof in administrative law cases is
preponderance of the evidence, there are exceptions to this rule when
important, vulnerable interests are at stake. For example, the
intermediate "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" test was
required by the U.S. Supreme Court in deportation hearings where a
resident of the United States faced the possibility of being forced to
leave the country. The stakes were deemed so high for the resident
that the Court required that the government prove its case at the
higher standard. 216 The intermediate standard has been applied in
other civil administrative settings when the potential losses for the
appellant are immense, such as involuntary commitment 217 and
expatriation cases. 2 18 Similarly, the courts have required the
intermediate standard of proof when a person's livelihood is at stake
in the proceedings, for example, in attorney disbarment cases. 2 19 This
standard has also been applied against the Federal Communications
Commission when it attempts to administratively revoke a person's

import of the decision and the values involved, see Elizabeth Mertz, The Burden of
ProofandAcademic Freedom:Protectionfor Institution or Individual?82 Nw.
U.L. REV. 492 (1988) (arguing that in academic freedom cases a simplified and
uniform approach to burden shifting is required and proposing that, for policy
reasons, the burden of proof should shift to the university and the standard be
elevated to "clear and convincing evidence" on the issue of motive for firing a
professor).
215 See, e.g., Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 574-75 (Haw. 1989).
2 16
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966). See also Thomas v. Nicholson,
423 F.3d 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (observing that the "clear and convincing"
standard is "reserved to protect particularly important interests in a limited number
of civil cases," such as deportation cases).
217 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
2 18
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 133 (1958).
219
See David M. Appel, Attorney DisbarmentProceedingsand the Standardof
Proof 24 HOFsTRA L. REV. 275, 284-85 (1995) (noting that New York is an
exception to the majority rule that an intermediate standard of proof is appropriate
for disbarment proceedings).
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broadcasting license. 220 As one commentator writes, "In situations
when individuals stand to suffer serious liabilities as a consequence
of administrative action, justice may be served by demanding
increased procedural protections." 22 1
The Supreme Court appears to agree with this assessment. When
looking at the burden of proof that should be applied in civil
commitment cases, it wrote:
At one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case
involving a monetary dispute between private
parties. Since society has a minimal concern with
the outcome of such private suits, plaintiffs burden
of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence.
The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly
equal fashion.2 22
The court contrasted this typical civil case with civil cases that
fall closer to the criminal end of the spectrum, where the burden of
proof is increased in order to reflect society's concern with potential
deprivation of fundamental rights.2 23
The stakes are equally high for public assistance appellants. The
consequences of losing safety-net benefits rival those of losing
employment, reputation, and even liberty. 224 The same policy reasons
See, e.g., Sea Island Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 240, 244 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (holding that revocation of an FCC broadcasting license is governed, at the
agency level, by the "clear and convincing" standard of proof, where a loss of
livelihood results).
221 Louis L. Jaffe, AdministrativeLaw: Burden ofProofandScope ofReview,
79 HARV. L. REv. 914, 919 (1966).
22 2
Addington, 441 U.S. at 423
223 Id
at 423-24.
224 One could argue that the deprivation of income, food, and health benefits
resulting from a denial or termination of public assistance rivals the devastation a
criminal defendant faces. Compare the typical criminal misdemeanor case with that
of a denial of medical or income benefits. A criminal defendant charged with
shoplifting, for example, is likely to suffer minimal consequences if convicted. Cf
21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 28 (1998) (noting that when it is the defendant's
first offense, many jurisdictions will charge as a misdemeanor a crime that could be
charged as a felony). Generally, little or no jail time is at stake. The likelihood is
that the crime is not prosecuted at all but rather referred to a pre-trial diversion
program. See Francis D. Doucette, Non-Appointment of Counsel in Indigent
220
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articulated by courts and commentators for applying the intermediate
standard of proof therefore apply with equal vigor to public benefits
hearings. The government and the public assistance appellant should
not share the risk of error equally when a loss of benefits could result
in hunger, homelessness, ill health, or even death for the appellant.
My proposal to change the burden of proof in public assistance
hearings is justified according to the traditional theoretical
underpinnings of burden assignment. 22 5 In the next section I will
describe the policies advanced by assigning the burdens of
production and persuasion to one party over another. I will then show
how the consistent placement of these burdens on the government in
public assistance administrative hearings furthers these policy goals.
B. Policy ConsiderationsSupport Shifting the Burden of Proofto
the State in All PublicAssistance Hearings
When legislatures and courts deviate from the standard rule that
the moving party bears the burden of proof,226 the reasoning,
although not always clearly articulated, tends to center on the themes
of procedural efficiency, allocation of the risk of an erroneous
CriminalCases: A Case Study, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 495, 502 (1997). Even with
minimal incarceration, some would argue that the criminal defendant is better off
as she is provided with food, shelter, clothing, and basic healthcare benefits. See
Fanner v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (stating that prisoners have a right to
"adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care"). On the other hand, the denied
public assistance applicant loses these basic needs when the state determines
ineligibility. See also supraPart I.A.
225 In addition to the difficulties that public assistance appellants have in
meeting their burdens of proof, they also face obstacles in convincing judges to
adopt their interpretations of governing statutes and regulations. Agencies'
interpretations of their enabling statutes are generally given deference by reviewing
courts, agency representatives are well versed in the law and standard
interpretations, and agencies have control over the regulatory process. I propose
that when a rule at issue in a welfare hearing is not clearly drafted, judges be
required to interpret the vague language against the drafter and in favor of the
appellant. This rule would force agencies to be more careful in their drafting and
provide another mechanism for balancing power in administrative hearing settings.
I hope to explore this idea more fully in the future.
226 MCCORMICK, supra note 152, § 337 at 412 ("The burdens of pleading and
proof with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff
who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore
naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.").
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decision, and basic fairness. 227 These three fundamental policy goals
demand that the burden be placed on the state in public assistance
hearings: procedural efficiency is served by this change because the
state has the better access to the information and facts in the hearing;
a sensible assessment of risk allocation reveals that the state is in the
best position to bear the risk of loss if the wrong decision is made;
and fairness concerns dictate that the balance of power that favors the
state should be leveled.2 2 8
As we have seen, most courts have historically been satisfied
with allocating the burden of proof based on the "long-established
procedural rule that he who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the
burden of proving it. "229 This default rule derives from the notion that
the argument for maintaining the status quo is presumed to be legally
superior to one that advocates change. 23 0 While the default rule
reflects sound policy in certain contexts - for example, the
presumption of constitutionality afforded to statutes 23 1 - courts in
public benefits hearings often follow the default rule without
Section 337 of McCormick on Evidence points out that "there is no key
principle governing the apportionment of the burdens of proof." McCORMICK,
supra note 152, at 415. Similarly, section 2486 of Wigmore on Evidence states that
"[t]he truth is that there is not and cannot be any one general solvent for all cases. It
is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different
situations." WIGMORE, supra note 152, at 291.
228
See generally JULIANE KOKOTT, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN COMPARATIVE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW APPROACHES WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (Peter Malanczuk,
ed., Kluwer Law International 1998); Edward W. Cleary, Presumingand Pleading:
An Essay on JuristicImmaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 11-13 (1959) (referring to
fairness, policy, and probability).
229 Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 373 P.2d 457, 462 (Cal.
1962). This concept is expressed by the legal maxims "actoriincumbit onus
probandi"and "ei incumbitprobatioqui dicit, non qui negat." KOKOTT, supra note
228, at 149.
230 See MCCORMICK, supra note 152, § 336 at 410.
231 Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1023 (Colo. 1982)
("Every statute is presumed constitutional unless proven beyond a reasonable doubt
to be constitutionally invalid."). The presumption of constitutionality effectively
operates to assign the burden to the party challenging the constitutionality of a
statute and is justified on the grounds that legislatures are more competent at factfinding than are courts, and that law made by legislatures is clearer, more reliable,
and more representative of the public interest than law made by judges. KOKOTT,
supranote 228, at 42-51.
227
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assessing whether or not it makes policy sense in that context. A
proper analysis reveals that it does not.
First, it is procedurally efficient to assign the burdens of proof to
the agency in public benefits hearings. 232 Generally speaking, the
theory of procedural efficiency holds that the party with the best
access to relevant information can most efficiently bear the burdens
of proof related to that information. 233 Therefore, unless justice
demands otherwise, courts generally allocate the burden of proof to
the party with superior access to information. 2 34
In the administrative hearing setting, it would be most efficient to
place the burden of production on the state or federal agency because
it almost always has far better access to information than public
assistance appellants. 2 35 Appellants lack access largely because
discovery, which has equalized access to information in most areas of
civil litigation,236 is more limited in agency hearings procedure.
Agency documents, files, and witnesses are therefore difficult for
appellants to obtain. In addition, agencies have discretion to
determine by rule whether or not discovery is permissible at all in the

See MCCORMICK, supra note 152, § 337 at 413 ("where the facts with
regard to an issue lie particularly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the
burden of proving the issue").
2 3
FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.8
(3d ed. 1985).
234
Id. However, procedural efficiency may not be so compelling that it will
trump other competing policies. See, e.g., KOKOTT, supra note 228, at 136. In cases
of fraud, for example, plaintiffs are routinely required to prove facts about which
they were misled in the fraudulent incident, even though that information could be
more easily acquired by the alleged perpetrator of the fraud. JAMES & HAZARD,
supra note 233, at 325. Furthermore, outside the context of administrative hearings,
modem developments in discovery have rendered procedural efficiency a far less
compelling justification for burden allocation: depositions and readily accessible
public records afford the parties functionally equivalent access to evidence in most
areas of litigation.
235 See Mulzer, supra note 119, at 696-98, wherein she describes the "harmrelated costs" to claimants " in obtaining and presenting documents and attending
appointments." She describes monetary costs of obtaining information, including
additional childcare, transportation, copying, postage, and lost wages.
23 6
See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989)
(noting that in employment discrimination cases, "liberal civil discovery rules give
plaintiffs broad access to employers' records in an effort to document their
claims").
232
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adjudicative proceeding, and the hearing officer can decide whether
or not to permit depositions or other discovery methods in a
particular case.23 7
Even if full discovery were permitted, unrepresented low-income
litigants would still have only limited access to relevant information
unless they were unusually legally sophisticated. Litigants may not
know which of the documents and evidence in their own agency files
are relevant to their case, so they may not understand what they
should request. Welfare agencies often have volumes of files on a
single client located in various parts of the agency. Knowing where
to look and what to look for is the province of the experienced
poverty law practitioner and is almost certainly beyond the skill set
of a pro se client.2 38
In contrast, welfare agencies have ready access to all kinds of
information about the clients, the benefits they want to receive, and
the law covering the programs. Agencies can obtain public assistance
recipients' tax filings, Social Security records, bank statements,

237 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4) (2000) ("Subject to published rules of the
agency and within its powers, employees presiding at hearings may... take
depositions or have depositions taken when the ends of justice would be served.");
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.446(2)-(3) (2003) ("An agency may by rule determine
whether or not discovery is to be available in adjudicative proceedings and, if so,
which forms of discovery may be used. Except as otherwise provided by agency
rules, the presiding officer may decide whether to permit the taking of depositions,
the requesting of admissions, and all other procedures authorized by rules 26
through 36 of the superior court civil rules. The presiding officer may condition use
of discovery on a showing of necessity and unavailability by other means.").
238 Even though a great deal of agency information is now available and
transmittable via computers, the poor often have little access to computers, email,
cell phones, and other technology that could help alleviate some of the barriers to
providing and receiving information from agencies. See Access to Justice
Technology Principles (Full Text & Comments), http://atjweb.org/principles/fulltext (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (adopted by the Washington State Supreme Court
Dec. 3, 2004) (laying out principles for use of technologies to promote equal access
to justice in the Washington State justice system); Donald J. Horowitz, Technology,
Values, and the Justice System: The Evolution of the Access to Justice Technology
Bill ofRights, 79 WASH. L. REv. 77, 80-84 (2004) (describing the development of
Washington State's Technology Bill of Rights initiative and the benefits to low
income and disabled residents). See also Julia Wentz, JusticeRequires Access to
the Law, 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 641, 644 (2005) (discussing the inspiration and
mission of Washington's Technology Bill of Rights).
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health records, and work records with relative ease.2 39 It is
procedurally efficient to require that the government use its vast
information gathering resources to obtain and provide the evidence
proving each element of eligibility in public assistance cases.
The second policy concern behind burden allocation entails an
inquiry into who should bear the risk of losing. Because "[t]he burden
of proof in any proceeding lies at first on that party against whom the
judgment of the court would be given if no evidence at all were
produced on either side," 240 courts and legislators decide which party,
absent any evidence to the contrary, ought to win. Put another way,
the question as to who should bear the burden of proof comes down
to "a comparison of the social costs between two potentially wrong
decisions." 241 The question is, given the interests at stake for each
party, which party is placed most at risk if an incorrect decision is
made in the case? Burden allocation is inherently based upon a value
judgment about the relative merits of the two sides' positions. 242
It is not merely the measure of proof required - be it a
preponderance of the evidence or a clear and convincing evidence
standard - that reflects the importance of the underlying right 24 3 or
interest at stake. Rather, the interplay between the measure of proof
and the allocation of the burden of proof indicates and, in many
cases, helps to facilitate the law's preferred outcome. Ultimately,
courts appear to be more willing to depart from the default rule of
requiring the moving party to bear the burden of proving all

239 Cf Wentz, supranote 238, at 645 (detailing online accessibility of statutes,

court decisions, administrative regulations, and govermnent publications); John C.
Reitz, E-Government, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 733, 737 (2006) (describing the
technological features of e-government, including online management of
information collected by agencies).
240
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAw 358 (Rothman Reprints 1969) (1898). See also In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he choice of the standard [of
proof] for a particular variety of adjudication does, I think, reflect a very
fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual
determinations.").
241 KOKorr, supranote 228, at 63.
242
See id. at 20-27.
243 Here, I am using the term "right" in the sense of statutory, regulatory, or
contract right to the benefit at issue, rather than a constitutional right or entitlement.
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affirmative allegations when that party's interests are highly valued
by society. 244
In public assistance hearings, the great importance of benefits to
the health and welfare of the poor and vulnerable is indisputable. The
very purpose of government poverty programs is to reduce hunger,
institutionalization, and dependence. 24 5 As the outcome of the
underlying benefits dispute is critical to survival, the applicant's
interest surely meets the policy criterion that we remove the burden
of proof from the moving party when an important right or interest is
at stake.
When we compare the social costs that an incorrect hearing
decision would impose on the government to those it would impose
on a public assistance applicant, it becomes even more apparent that
the risk of loss should be on the state. An erroneous decision against
the agency generally means a loss of money to the state. The agency
will be required to provide income, medical care, or food to a family
that does not meet the very stringent financial or disability
requirements of the program. However, the agency can act to avoid
future incorrect hearing decisions by rewriting the regulations at
issue to clarify eligibility or by working harder to obtain the factual
evidence and financial records needed to meet its burden. On the
other hand, an erroneous decision denying public benefits to people
who are, in fact, legally entitled to the benefit can have devastating
consequences. Unlike the government, benefits applicants have,
practically speaking, no way of effectively correcting a wrong
decision against them. 24 6
A final policy motivating burden allocation is essentially fairness:
given the relative power of the parties to the litigation, on which
party is it most fair to place the burdens? The theory is that in order
to make the litigation process fair, the burden should lie with the
party that holds superior power in the proceeding. In some areas of
law, courts have refused to accept the basic premise that the party
making a claim or raising a defense bears the burden of proving it
and have looked instead at what is the most fair allocation under the

24

SeeKOKOTr, supra note 228, at 98.

245 See supra Part I.A.
246

See supra Part I.B for reasons why appellants have limited appeal options
from an administrative hearing decision.
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particular circumstances of the case. 24 7 For example, in the recent
case Schaffer v. Weast, the Supreme Court considered which party
should bear the burden of proof in an administrative hearing
involving a denial of special education benefits: the disabled child
challenging the denial of benefits or the school district defending its
plan? 248 The majority held that, in the absence of statutory allocation
of the burden, the default rule applies: the burden of persuasion in an
administrative hearing challenging an Individual Education Plan
("IEP") falls on the party seeking relief (almost always the child
challenging the plan).2 4 9
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, observed that given the three policy
considerations behind burden allocation, there was a strong case that
the school district, not the disabled child, should bear the burden.
"[O]ne can reasonably argue ... that, given the technical nature of
the subject matter, its human importance, the school district's
superior resources, and the district's superior access to relevant
information," he wrote, "the risk of nonpersuasion ought to fall upon
the district." 25 0 These considerations apply with equal force to public
assistance appellants. Just as special education benefits appellants do,
public assistance appellants must deal with highly technical and
difficult issues while contending against an agency with superior
resources and access to information. And the subject matter in both
cases is of great "human importance." For these same reasons, the
risk of nonpersuasion ought to fall on the government in the public
assistance context.
Even the reasoning behind Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
supports the notion that the burden in public assistance cases should
fall on the state. Justice O'Connor based her holding in significant
part on the fact that the Individuals with Disabilities Act ("IDEA")
affords appellant disabled children a particularly full panoply of
procedural protections. 25 1 By contrast, most of those procedural
See, e.g., Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 63 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
248 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 51.
247

2 49

250

Id. at 56-62.

Id. at 69. Justice Breyer concluded that the statute had left the issue to the
states to decide. Id.
251 Id. at 60-61. See generally Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000), specifically id. § 1415 (regarding procedural
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protections are not available to public assistance appellants. Justice
O'Connor went on to state that because these protections exist in an
IDEA hearing, it is not unfair to place the burden on the appellant:
"[Disabled children] are not left to challenge the government without
a realistic opportunity to access the necessary evidence, or without an
expert with the firepower to match the opposition." 252
Public assistance appellants, by contrast, are left to challenge the
government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary
evidence and without the firepower to match the state. They are not
given the opportunity to look at the evidence in the same way a
parent is in special education cases. 25 3 Furthermore, unlike welfare
agencies,254 school districts are required by IDEA to give the reasons
behind disputed actions, details about the other options rejected by
the individualized education program team, and a description of all
evaluations, reports, and other factors that the school used in coming
to its decision.2 5 5 Nor are public assistance agencies required to pay
for an appellant's own independent experts if the appellant disagrees
with an evaluation obtained by the agency, as they are in IDEA

cases. 2 56
Finally, Justice O'Connor states not only that the most important
of IDEA's procedural protections is that parents may recover
attorney's fees if they prevail at the hearing, but also that the purpose
of this and other protections is to "ensure that the school bears no
unique informational advantage" over the appellant.2 57 The attorney's
safeguards). The procedural safeguards afforded by the IDEA include the
requirement that the school district provide parents with detailed reasoning behind
its decisions, including the other options considered and rejected, id. §
1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(I) (Supp. 2005); reasonable attorneys' fees covered when parents
prevail at the administrative hearing, id. § 1415(i)(3)(B); and the right of parents to
obtain an independent district paid expert evaluation of their child, id. § 1415(b)(1).
252 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61.
253

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2000).

Public assistance applicants and recipients are entitled to reasonable notice
of the agency decision and the reasons behind it, but not in any detail. 42 C.F.R. §
498.74 (2006); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-02-0515 (2005); id. 388-02-0520.
Agency notices are often criticized as incomplete and incomprehensible.
255 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(I) (Supp. 2005).
256 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (2007) (IDEA provision giving parents a
right to independent educational evaluation at public expense).
257 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000).
254
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fees provision gives IDEA appellants two huge advantages: they can
access attorney representation 258 and the significant financial risk of
the fee shifting provision encourages school districts to settle cases
favorably when they are not confident they will prevail. Public
assistance appellants do not share these two advantages. No state has
an attorney's fee statute providing that the state pay appellants' fees if
it loses at the administrative level.2 59 As a result, appellants in this
forum are almost entirely unrepresented, and the government has no
incentive to settle cases where the facts or law may somewhat favor
the appellant.
In Schaffer, Justice O'Connor held that it was fair to place the
burden on the appellant in an IDEA hearing because IDEA affords
appellants such procedural protections as attorney's fees if they
prevail. 260 That same rationale leads to the opposite result in public
assistance cases because public assistance appellants enjoy none of
the advantages afforded to IDEA appellants. Applying the reasoning
employed by Justice O'Connor, one concludes that the burdens in
public assistance cases should be placed on the state.
There are other areas of administrative law where the burden of
proof at the hearing level has been placed squarely on the
government or its equivalent due to precisely the same policy
considerations just described. For example, in the Black Lung cases,

258 Jessica Butler-Arkow, The Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation
Improvement Act of2004: Shifting School Districts'Attorneys'Fees to Parents of
Children with Disabilitiesand Counsel, 42 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 527, 527 (2006).
259 Fees are sometimes available for appellants who prevail at the court level,
but not at the administrative hearing. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 74.08.080(3)
(2001). Although claimants for SSI and Social Security benefits are permitted to
have representation by counsel at their own expense, the Social Security
Administration is not required to appoint an attorney to represent a claimant at
government expense. Toledo v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 435 F.2d 1297,
1297 (1st Cir. 1971). However, where an action involves complex legal and factual
issues it has been suggested that courts consider appointing counsel for the
claimant. Parshall v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. A. No. 93-MC-441-SAC, 1993 WL
393742 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 1993), adheredto on reconsideration,Civ. A. No. 934200-SAC, 1993 WL 463469 (D. Kan. Oct. 18, 1993); Cortez v. Sec'y, Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., No. 88 Civ. 8497 (SWK), 1991 WL 2758 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
9, 1991).
2
6 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61.
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prior to Greenwich Collieries,26 1 courts recognized the important
judicial policy that "all doubtful questions are to be resolved in favor
of the injured employee in order to place the burden of possible error
on the employer who is better able to bear it." 262 Similarly, in
veterans benefits cases, Congress has provided statutory protection
for veterans who administratively appeal denials of claims for
income and health benefits: "When there is an approximate balance
of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the
determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the
doubt to the claimant." 263
Special education cases, where parents are challenging school
district decisions on what educational services will be provided to
their children with disabilities, are similar to veterans benefits, Black
Lung, and public assistance appeals in their complexity and in the
benefit's critical importance to the lives of recipients. In these cases,
even after the Schaffer decision,2 6 states are allowed to assign the
burden in hearings to the school district.265 Many states, after
weighing the policy considerations, have chosen to require that the
In Greenwich Collieries,the Supreme Court held that the APA default rule
required that miners appealing denials of Black Lung benefits must carry the
burden of proof in the administrative hearing. See supra notes 192-201 and
accompanying text.
262 Bath Iron Works Corp. v. White, 584 F.2d 569, 574 (1st Cir. 1978). See
also Jones v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of Labor, 977 F.2d
1106, 1109 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting the true doubt rule "place[s] the burden of
possible error on those best able to bear it," i.e., employers) (citing Noble Drilling
Co. v. Drake, 795 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986)).
263 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2000). See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2007).
264 The majority in Schaffer left open the possibility that individual states could
set the burden in special education administrative hearings differently than the
default rule. 546 U.S. at 61-62 ("Finally, respondents and several States urge us to
decide that States may, if they wish, override the default rule and put the burden
always on the school district . ... Because no such law or regulation exists in
Maryland, we need not decide this issue today.").
265 A recent special education case, Escambia County Board ofEducation v.
Benton, indicates that Schaffer would not bar states from assigning the burden of
proof to school districts where the program statutes are silent. 406 F. Supp. 2d
1248, 1263 (S.D. Ala. 2005). Specifically, the Court in EscambiaCounty found
that Schaffer is the "default rule" in circumstances where no state rule purports to
shift the burden to the school district. Id. However, in the present case, the court
stated that the default rule was not applicable because the law at the time of the
administrative decision placed the burden on the school districts. Id. at 1264.
261
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school district bear the burdens of production and persuasion in all
special education administrative appeals. 266
Even in some public assistance appeals, the state bears the burden
of proof in the administrative hearing. For example, in Food Stamp
hearings to determine if there has been an intentional program
violation,2 6 7 the government bears the burden of proof and must
prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.2 6 8 Some states have
instituted similar safeguards to protect Medicaid applicants whose
eligibility is in question because they allegedly gave away assets to
meet the program's financial requirements: 269 the burden can be
placed on the welfare agency in the hearing to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person knowingly and
willingly transferred the resource at less than market value for the
purpose of qualifying for the Medicaid benefit.27 0
The theories behind placing the burden on the state in all of these
administrative and civil arenas fully support making the same change
for welfare appeals. A clear and convincing evidence standard in all
cases involving needs-based public benefits will further the
efficiency of the hearing process, properly allocate the risk of loss to
the party best able to bear it, and improve the fairness of the process
by having the government, which controls public assistance program
eligibility, prove its case.

266

See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14(a) (2005) (placing burden on
school district); 14 DEL. C. § 3140 (1999) (same); W. VA. CODE R. § 126-168.1.11(c) (2005) (same); INN. STAT. ANN. § 125A.091, subd. 16 (West Supp.
2005) (burden varies depending upon remedy sought); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 1604-7.18(1)(g)(8) (2002) (default rule places burden on moving party, but this
allocation can be altered depending on remedy sought).
267 In an intentional program violation hearing, the agency is attempting to
disqualify a Food Stamp recipient because it believes the household has
intentionally given false information to the agency. See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(b) (2000);
7 C.F.R. § 273.16 (2007).
2687 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6) (2007).
269 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (stipulating that benefits are to be denied in such
cases270without specifying the allocation of the burden of proof).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 74.08.080(2)(g) (2001). Attorneys' fees are
also awarded at the administrative level to appellants who prevail in their appeals
of the Medicaid penalty. Id.
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C. How to Make These Changes
Advocates for shifting the burden of proof can reach this goal in
several ways. The most comprehensive and effective way to
eliminate confusion and create a national standard would be to lobby
Congress to amend the specific welfare programs' enabling statutes.
The Food Stamp Act and the SSI, Medicaid, and TANF sections of
the Social Security Act would be changed to place the burden of
proof, by clear and convincing evidence, on state and federal
agencies in all needs-based entitlement and welfare reform programs
that receive federal funds. With the exception of the SSI program,
which is entirely federally funded and administered, each of these
programs is created by federal law and administered by the states.2 71
Therefore, Congress has the authority to institute a uniform burden
allocation and an identical level of proof across all states, something
it has not chosen to do to date.27 2 One advantage of this approach is
that all state and federal agencies regulating the TANF, SSI, Food
Stamp, and Medicaid programs would have the same burden to
develop evidence regarding eligibility and to respond to hearing
decisions interpreting their regulations.
If Congress chooses not to act, the proposed change in the
burdens of proof could also be implemented state-by-state by
amending individual state administrative procedure acts to create an
exception to the default rule that the burden is on the party
challenging an agency's action. 273 This strategy would be appropriate
in those states whose APAs are applicable to public assistance
hearings and appeals. 274 The exception would apply only to
applicants for and recipients of needs-based public assistance
benefits. The current burdens would remain in place for all other
programs that do not require a finding of financial need to be eligible.
In addition, all state and federal agency statutes and regulations
dealing with fair hearings involving eligibility for needs-based public
assistance benefits could be amended to incorporate the new burdens
See supra Part L.A for my discussion of the structure of the programs.
The lack of a standard burden assignment in federal law is in large part the
reason for the confusion in burden assignment in public assistance hearings case
law. See id.
273 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 34.05.570(l)(a) (2003).
274 See supra note 157 for a partial listing of such states.
271
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of proof in needs-based programs, including all application,
termination, and overpayment cases.
D. The Impact of Changingthe Burden
What would the world of public benefits look like if we required
the state and federal governments to show by clear and convincing
evidence why the applicant or recipient does not meet the eligibility
requirements? How would state and federal agencies be affected by
this change? Would the floodgates open when all who applied won
their benefits on appeal? Would state and federal budgets be
overwhelmed because so many more people would be found eligible
and so many more state workers would be required to document
eligibility requirements?
The short answer is no.
First, while initially more appellants would likely be found
eligible for benefits, particularly in close cases, it is doubtful that
large numbers of factually ineligible clients would prevail. In the
criminal system, even with the highest level of proof placed on the
state - it has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt - and with a

presumption of innocence,27 5 the right to trial by jury,2 7 6 and the right
to legal counsel, 277 the vast majority of people charged with crimes
by the state are convicted, either after a trial or through plea
bargaining. 278 Similarly, public assistance agencies are unlikely to be
faced with a glut of ineligible clients winning benefits.
It is, however, likely that under my proposed regime, more clients
would win benefits in close cases. Still, the fiscal floodgates need not
open: if the state found that too many people were winning at
hearing, it could either tighten eligibility rules or improve the quality

275

E.g.,

WASH.

REv. CODE 9A.04.100(1) (2000).

276 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340, 344-45 (1963) (requiring
publicly paid attorneys for criminal defendants who cannot afford to pay for their
own).
278 In 2002, 68% of defendants in serious charges were convicted of the
offense within one year. Of the 25% who were not convicted, 24% were dismissed
without trial and only 1%were acquitted. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 2002 24
(2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fdluc02.pdf.
277
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of the cases it presents at hearings. Either of these methods of
allocating scarce resources and making public policy would be fairer
and more appropriate than the current method: capitalizing on
procedural advantages to cut off benefits to the most vulnerable
members of our society, those who are least able to argue a case at
hearing. To the extent that agencies did see more low-income
appellants winning their benefits claims, the reasons would be that
the evidence for ineligibility was not strong in these cases and that
the appellants' arguments had merit. When the claimant is not clearly
ineligible, it is appropriate to err on the side of eligibility for brutal
needs benefits.
Second, agencies will actually function better in several ways if
we place the burdens squarely on the state. Placing the burdens of
proof and persuasion on the state forces it to do its homework and
increases the quality of agency decision making. Instead of relying
on the inability of its clients to play the hearing game, the state will
actually have to prove every element of ineligibility in every case. As
a result, the state will take greater care with each client's case,
resulting in better-defended and -articulated eligibility decisions. And
we should demand that agencies take great care when they determine
a client's eligibility for life-saving benefits. Because those benefits
can be so critical, it makes sense to require a higher level of proof as
a sort of quality control over agency decisions. Furthermore, if
agencies routinely take care with each client, clients may actually
appeal denials less often because they will better understand exactly
why their claims were denied.
Third, if the state developed better and more reliable information
to prove its cases, then law-makers and agency managers would have
more accurate statistics about who is and is not meeting eligibility
requirements. At present, it is difficult to assemble statistics that
reflect the actual level of need among agency clients because
eligibility depends so heavily on the resourcefulness of each
individual client.27 9 Accurate numbers are important when policy and
budget decisions are being made about who should be allowed these
benefits. Policy makers should base their decisions not on the skill
with which claimants can make their cases but rather on accurate
279 Ironically, persons who face the greatest need are often the least physically
and mentally able to compile the financial and medical evidence they need to prove
eligibility. See supra note 86.
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eligibility figures generated by the agencies in charge of public
assistance programs.
A recent action by the Washington State legislature puts an
unexpected twist on this last theory and helps prove my point. During
the 2003 session, in order to save state dollars during a tight budget
year, the legislature changed the burden of proof in administrative
hearings for clients who have been terminated from the GA-U
benefit. 280 Whereas before, the agency had to prove that a change in a
client's condition rendered him or her ineligible, now the
"[Department of Social & Health Services will] discontinue benefits
for General Assistance-Unemployable (GA-U) clients unless the
client demonstrates that their medical or mental condition has not
improved and they therefore still need a GAU cash grant and medical
benefits." 28 1 It was estimated that the change would lead to over
seven million dollars in savings per year.
The legislature knew that many previously eligible clients would
be unable to re-prove their eligibility. Thus, the legislature knew that
those most in need but least capable of putting on a case would be cut
from the program, not because they were no longer disabled or lowincome, but because they would not have the skills to represent
themselves in the process. It is cynical and unfair to cut a budget by
making it more difficult for those already at a steep disadvantage to
prove their eligibility. I am proposing the opposite - that we
determine eligibility for benefits fairly and transparently and that we
base policy decisions on real information about who is and is not
sufficiently needy to receive benefits.

280 Redefining

Eligibility for General Assistance, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws ch.
10, availableat http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bil 1=2252&year2003 (amending WASH. REv. CODE 74 .04.005(6)(g)). The GA-U program
provides income and medical benefits to low income single people who are
disabled, but do not qualify for Social Security or SSI. WASH. REV. CODE
74.04.005(6)(a) (2001). These clients are typically unmarried, have no children,
and have shorter term mental and physical disabilities (lasting less than a year)
preventing them from working.
281 Washington State Legislative Budget Notes, 2005-05 Biennium 253
(October 2003), availableat http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/Ibns/2003dshs.pdf.
See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-448-0160(2) (2005) (implementing the General
Assistance budget change by requiring that the recipient present additional medical
evidence showing no material improvement in order to continue to be eligible for
GA-U).
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Fourth, requiring the state to prove its case in every instance will
also result in agencies writing better and more clearly articulated
regulations. Agency rules that were unclear would be interpreted
against the drafter and in favor of eligibility.2 8 2 In this way, agencies
would be encouraged to identify and clarify ambiguous rules. Clients
would benefit from consistent and reasonable interpretations of
regulations and more easily understood eligibility requirements.
Finally, it is likely that agencies would settle more appeals of
public assistance denials and terminations because in cases that are
not clear-cut, the agencies would know they were less likely to
prevail on appeal. More cases would also be settled by clients, who
would have access to better written rules and better developed
evidence. Placing the burden of proof on the state would allow for
more efficient use of the administrative hearing system: there would
be fewer hearings, more developed factual records and legal
arguments, and more cases where there is a real dispute about the
facts or the law.
I believe that the procedures in place in the administrative hearing
process are inappropriately used by agencies to help balance budgets
by filtering out a segment of public assistance applicants who are, in
fact, eligible. 283 If the government wishes to limit access to brutal
needs benefits, it should do it up front in its statutory and regulatory
eligibility requirements, not at the back end by profiting from
standards of proof that render the least capable and most needy
unlikely to make their case. Government should make clear decisions
about who is eligible for benefits and who is not, write unambiguous
regulations setting out these resource allocation decisions, and amend
those regulations when hearing decisions interpret them in ways not
intended by the agency. In this way, agency regulations will more
precisely reflect the actual intent of government.

282 Cf 17A AM. JUR. 2D

Contracts§ 343.

283 See, e.g., Mulzer, supra note 119, at 690-94 (demonstrating that

burdensome verification procedures result in the wrongful denial of needs-based
benefits to actually eligible individuals: "Churning occurs when a claimant fails to
receive benefits-or has her benefits terminated-for reasons that are 'wholly
administrative' and therefore 'unrelated to the [claimant's] actual need for public
assistance."').
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IV. CONCLUSION

The public assistance hearing system is the primary justice
system for low-income citizens who challenge the government's
denial of basic human needs benefits. In this system, the playing field
is heavily biased against claimants. In my view, the most equitable
and efficient way of leveling this field is a simple procedural device:
allocating the burden of proof to the state and requiring that it prove
its case by clear and convincing evidence. Placing the burdens of
production and persuasion on the government in public benefits cases
accomplishes a major step toward reasonably equal justice. This
solution will more simply, fairly, and directly assist clients than
providing access to counsel or relying on judges to raise relevant
legal issues the parties have missed or to ask questions to determine
the admissibility of evidence when a pro se appellant is unable to

master the rules. 284
It is time for advocates to call attention to the inequities in the
public assistance administrative hearing system and to argue for
changes that will make this process a real justice system for the poor.
Requiring that the government prove every element of its case at the
high standard of clear and convincing evidence will go a long way
towards creating a system that meets this goal.

See also Cantrell,supra note 23, at 1574 (postulating that there are three
possible ways to eradicate the problem of unequal access to legal representation of
the poor in civil cases: provide more free attorneys for the poor; alter the legal
process so that it is less dependent on attorneys; or alter low-income people's
ability to navigate the system).
24

